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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
Net income is not something one can determine in an unambiguous way. As accounting 
legislation does not completely constrain managers’ choices of accounting policies and 
procedures, management has flexibility in determining financial reporting figures. Actual 
earnings management behavior, on the other hand, has been documented to arise from 
contractual, stock market or management’s personal incentives (Scott 2009; Graham et al. 
2005). 
 
Earnings management has been a topic of research already for several decades (e.g. Healy 
1985; Jones 1991). Academic research has traditionally concentrated on analyzing accruals 
manipulation, i.e. earnings management implemented by altering the level of discretionary 
accruals. However, there are recent research findings indicating that real earnings 
management, i.e. earnings management implemented by manipulating real operations, is 
becoming more dominating in today’s business environment (e.g. Li et al. 2011; Graham et al. 
2005; Roychowdhury 2006). As evaluating reasons behind recent earnings management 
behavior, it has been suggested that preferring real earnings management might be a 
consequence of the stigma attached to accounting fraud in the post-Enron world, where also 
legislation is made stricter (Graham et al. 2005). At the same time, it has been suggested that 
real earnings management can be more costly for a company in the long run than accruals 
manipulation (Roychowdhury 2006).  
 
The level of real earnings management is argued to be higher in countries with stronger legal 
system (Li et al. 2011). Closely relating to this, prior research evidence indicates that 
companies have switched from accrual-based to real earnings management after the passage of 
Sarbanes Oxley-Act (SOX) in the US (Cohen et al. 2009). Also the effect of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) on earnings management has been studied, but 
research findings are controversial. While some studies suggest IFRS to have a positive 
influence on accounting quality and earnings management (e.g. Barth et al. 2009; Chen et al. 
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2010), some other publications indicate increase in earnings management after IFRS (Jeanjean 
and Stolowy 2008). Earlier research studying the effects of IFRS adoption has focused on 
accounting quality and thus concentrates on accrual-based earnings management. 
 
All listed companies in European Union (EU) member countries have been required to apply 
IFRS since 2005. Respectively, all Finnish publicly quoted companies were required to adopt 
IFRS in 2005. This creates an opportunity and motivations to study the effect of IFRS 
adoption on earnings management in Finland. Controversial research findings of the effect of 
IFRS adoption on accrual-based earnings management make it interesting to study the 
phenomenon from accruals manipulation viewpoint. Further, research evidence suggesting a 
shift from accrual-based to real earnings management in context of legislation change in the 
US encourages widening research scope to cover both two earnings management types.  
 
1.2. OBJECTIVES AND CONTRIBUTION 
 
In this study I will concentrate on analyzing earnings management, including accruals 
manipulation and real earnings management, in Finnish publicly quoted companies. Real 
earnings management is examined by concentrating on sales manipulation and 
overproduction. The main objective of this study is to examine whether mandatory IFRS 
adoption has affected earnings management practices in Finnish publicly quoted companies.  
 
There is research evidence suggesting that companies’ earnings management incentives vary 
in different financial situations (Agarwal et al. 2007). Financial situation in Finland changes 
during the research period, as economic downturn takes place at the end of the sample period. 
This creates motivations to analyze yearly earnings management development in the sample 
companies. Respectively, the secondary objective of this study is to examine whether there are 
annual changes in the level of earnings management which do not relate to IFRS adoption. 
 
The empirical part of the study will be implemented as a quantitative analysis applying OLS 
regression model to explore changes in the levels of earnings management. Accruals 
manipulation will be analyzed by using the Jones (1991) model. Real earnings management 
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will be examined by following Roychowdhury (2006) and thus the analysis is implemented by 
using the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998). Real earnings management analysis is 
implemented by studying sales manipulation and overproduction.  
 
The sample consists of Finnish publicly quoted companies in Helsinki Stock Exchange for 
years 2001-2010.  Companies representing banks, investment or insurance firms (primary 
SIC-codes 60-67) are excluded from the sample. The final sample includes 952 firm-year 
observations for accrual-based earnings management analysis, 1005 for sales manipulation 
and 931 for overproduction. The sample is divided into subsamples in two different ways 
according to the two research objectives. In relation to the main objective studying the effect 
of IFRS adoption on earnings management, the sample is divided into two subsamples based 
on accounting regulation, i.e. Finnish Accounting Standards (FAS) and IFRS subsamples. In 
relation to the second objective examining annual changes in earnings management practices, 
the sample is divided into ten yearly subsamples. Regression is run separately for different 
subsamples in order to evaluate differences in the levels of earnings management.  
 
Study results suggest an increase in accrual-based earnings management and overproduction 
after IFRS adoption. In addition, the results offer some support for an increase in sales 
manipulation after IFRS. Study results are in line with international research suggesting 
increasing popularity of real earnings management (e.g. Li et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2005; 
Roychowdhury 2006). However, as the levels of both accrual-based and real earnings 
management are suggested to have increased after IFRS adoption, the results are not in line 
with Cohen et al. (2009), who suggest a shift from accrual-based to real earnings management 
after the passage of SOX in the US. In relation to the secondary objective, study results 
indicate that there are annual changes in the levels of all three earnings management types 
during the sample period which do not relate to IFRS adoption. This can be seen to be in line 
with prior research suggesting managements’ earnings management incentives to vary in 
different financial situations (Agarwal et al. 2007). 
 
This study contributes to prior research by providing information about the effect of IFRS 
adoption on accrual-based and real earnings management in Finland. Further, it supports the 
 4 
 
view that earnings management behavior and motivations might vary in different years and in 
different financial situations.  
 
1.3. STRUCTURE 
 
This study consists of six chapters. After introduction, the second chapter will start by 
familiarizing the reader with the topic of earnings management. More specifically, the chapter 
concentrates on six different themes that are important from the viewpoint of the research 
topic: earnings management definitions, connection to accounting theory, earnings 
management incentives, different types of earnings management, research methods and 
earnings management in Finland. After this, the third chapter will continue by concentrating 
on IFRS adoption. The chapter discusses main approaches under IFRS framework and 
presents prior research findings of the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management. The 
fourth chapter will begin the empirical part of the study by discussing hypothesis 
development, research methods and data. This is followed by presenting and analyzing study 
results in the fifth chapter. Finally, conclusions will summarize main results of the study by 
binding them to earlier academic research and make suggestions for future research. 
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2. EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
The second chapter aims to familiarize the reader with the topic of earnings management. The 
chapter concentrates on six different themes that are important from the viewpoint of earnings 
management: earnings management definitions (2.1), connection to accounting theory (2.2), 
earnings management incentives (2.3), earnings management types (2.4), different research 
methods (2.5) and earnings management in Finland (2.6).   
 
2.1. DEFINITIONS 
 
2.1.1. Earnings management  
 
Many alternative definitions of earnings management have been suggested in the academic 
literature. According to Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368): 
 
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholder about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.“ 
 
In the above definition, Healy and Wahlen (1999) highlight managers’ personal judgment and 
their objective to mislead stakeholders about a company’s performance. Further, the 
researchers refer to the aim to influence contractual outcomes that rely on accounting 
numbers, of which debt covenants are a good example. In addition, the definition refers to two 
means in managing earnings: using judgment in financial reporting and structuring 
transactions. Therefore, the definition covers both accruals manipulation and real earnings 
management.  
 
Accrual-based earnings management refers to managing earnings figures by altering the level 
of discretionary accruals. Accruals are the difference between reported earnings and cash flow 
from operations and discretionary accruals are the accruals chosen by the management. 
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Further, discretionary accruals are chosen from an opportunity set of generally accepted 
procedures that are allowed by accounting legislation. (Healy 1985) 
 
2.1.2. Real Earnings management 
 
Real earnings management involves managements’ attempts to alter reported earnings by 
adjusting the timing and/or scale of underlying business activities (Xu et al. 2007). As 
business activities are affected, real activities manipulation alters earnings through the cash 
flow component. As a consequence, real earnings management has an effect on a company’s 
cash flow statement figures. According to Roychowdhury (2006, p. 337): 
 
“Real activities manipulation is a departure from normal operational practices, 
motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders into 
believing that certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal 
course of operations.” 
 
The definition is similar to the earnings management definition from Healy and Wahlen 
(1999), presented in chapter 2.1.1 As Roychowdhury (2006) refers to actions which are 
motivated by managers’ desire, Healy and Wahlen (1999) highlight managers’ personal 
judgment in accounting decisions. Further, both definitions include the aim to mislead 
stakeholders. What is specific to real earnings management definition is the objective to 
mislead stakeholders into believing that certain goals have been met in the normal course of 
operations, i.e. to believe that no unusual and irrational operational decisions are made.  
 
2.2. CONNECTION TO THEORY 
 
A typical feature of a modern corporation is the separation of ownership and control (Jensen 
& Meckling 1976). This includes that the owner (the principal) engages the manager (the 
agent) to perform services on behalf of her and delegates decision making authority to the 
agent. This is called the agency theory. The agency theory helps to analyze the relationship 
between the principal and the agent. It analyses contracts designed to motivate a rational agent 
to act on behalf of a principal when her interests could otherwise conflict with those of the 
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principal (Scott 2009). The separation of ownership and control has been seen as the original 
reason behind corporate governance problems (Bergstresser & Philippon 2006). Taking the 
same viewpoint, it can also be seen as enabling earnings management. As ownership is 
separated from control (management), it is possible for managers to manage earnings against 
owners’ interest (Scott 2009).  
 
From a theoretical viewpoint it can be noted that the existence of earnings management and 
the assumption of perfect markets conflict. If the information markets were perfect, there 
would be no possibilities to benefit from earnings management activities and a rational 
manager would not engage in managing earnings (Fields et al. 2001). Implicitly, it is assumed 
that management has an information advantage over a company’s stakeholders. 
 
Earnings management may also be evaluated from the viewpoint of the signaling theory. 
Signaling refers to a situation where one party conveys information to another party. Scott et 
al. (2009) define signal as an action taken by a high-type manager that would not be rational if 
that manager was low type. Scott et al. (2009) suggest that earnings management may be used 
for signaling. More specifically, the authors argue that earnings management to reveal 
persistent earnings power can be interpreted as a signal since earnings reversal can make it 
very costly for a low-type manager to report higher earnings that can be maintained. 
 
2.3. EARNINGS MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES  
 
Earnings management reasons are often divided to contractual and stock market incentives. 
However, some recent studies (Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006) suggest that also 
managers’ personal incentives may affect the decision-making process. In this study, 
contractual and stock market related incentives are first discussed based on an assumption that 
management acts to maximize the wealth of a company. After this, earnings management is 
discussed by analyzing managers’ personal incentives. From this point of view, it is also taken 
into account that a manager may not choose the actions optimal for the company, but to seek 
to maximize her own welfare.  
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2.3.1. Contractual incentives 
 
Earnings management can be used to protect a company from undesirable consequences 
deriving from its contractual obligations (Scott 2009). Earnings management literature usually 
discusses option contracts in the context of contractual incentives. In this study, management 
compensation topic will be discussed from the perspective of management’s personal 
incentives. 
 
Managers may choose to manage earnings because of debt contracts. Lenders often use debt 
covenants, meaning that they use accounting information to control firm’s activities (Beneish 
2001). Covenant restrictions may for example require that company’s financial ratios (e.g. 
debt to equity ratio, ROA) remain at an acceptable level. If covenants are violated, the cost of 
debt capital can increase. Because of this, debt covenants may provide management with 
incentives to manage earnings to avoid covenant violation. Managers might also go further 
and try not to be close to violation because this might limit their operational flexibility (Scott 
2009). For example, a company might want to avoid a situation where it has to reject a 
profitable project when the implementation could lead to a temporary covenant violation.  
 
There is evidence about the effect of debt contracts on companies’ accounting decisions. Firms 
approaching covenant violations are found to make more income increasing discretionary 
accounting changes than the comparison firms and to early adopt income increasing 
accounting changes (Sweeney 1994). Further, the companies which have reported a debt 
covenant violation are found to have abnormal accruals both at year prior to violation and at 
the violation year (DeFond & Jiambalvo 1994).  
 
Earnings management may also derive from implicit contracts (Scott 2009). Implicit contracts 
arise from the continuing relationship between a company and its stakeholders (e.g. 
employees, customers, suppliers, lenders) when the parties form their expectations based on 
past business practices. For example, if a company has good reputation of paying its invoices 
and borrowings in time, it may achieve better terms for transactions than companies not 
meeting their commitments so promptly. Consequently, both of the parties may implicitly 
assume that these are the new terms of the contract even though they are not explicitly agreed 
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on. (Scott 2009) Bowen et al. (1995) conclude the same idea by stating that a company’s 
reputation for fulfilling its implicit claims affects trade terms it is able to negotiate with its 
stakeholders. Further, the researchers suggest that stakeholders use reported accounting figures 
to analyze the ability of a company to meet its commitments, which provides management 
with an incentive to manage earnings upwards.  
 
2.3.2. Stock market related incentives 
 
Stock market based incentives often relate to communicating insider information to the 
markets, issuing shares, meeting earnings benchmarks or smoothing earnings. The view of 
earnings management as a mean of stakeholder communication bases on the information 
context of financial reports. In addition to concluding details about an entity’s past 
performance, accounting reports also reflect management’s estimates and forecasts about the 
future (Palepu et al. 2007), like estimations for bad debt and warranty provisions and forecasts 
of asset values. On the other hand, balance sheet value of an item reflects management’s 
expectations that future cash flows produced by the asset exceed the cost. From this 
perspective management can be seen as using accounting discretion to inform the markets 
about the true state of a company.  
 
In the context of the theoretical discussion in chapter 2.2, it was suggested that there has to be 
an information asymmetry between a company and its stakeholders. When earnings 
management is analyzed from the perspective of communicating information to the markets, it 
is seen as a mean to reduce the information asymmetry between the parties. Instead of trying 
to benefit the company by misleading company outsiders, the management aims to benefit all 
the parties. Scott (2009) sees this as the good side of earnings management. (Scott 2009) 
 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) may provide managers with incentives to manage earnings. In 
an IPO situation company’s shares do not have an established market price and investors have 
to decide how to value the shares (Scott 2009). Companies may manage earnings in order to 
affect the valuation. Teoh et al. (1998a) study accruals manipulation in IPO situations. The 
researchers provide evidence suggesting that issuers with unusually high accruals in the IPO 
year experience poor stock market performance in the following three years. In fact, issuers in 
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the most “aggressive” earnings managers’ quartile are found to have twenty percent lower 
stock market returns than the issuers in the most “conservative” quartile. Similar evidence has 
been documented when examining the equity issues of companies already being listed. Teoh et 
al. (1998b) find that issuers adjusting their discretionary accruals to report a higher net income 
just before the offering have lower stock returns and net income after the issue. Thus, both of 
the studies document a negative correlation between accruals manipulation and stock market 
returns after the issue.  
 
Meeting or exceeding earnings benchmarks can also provide companies with incentives to 
manage earnings. Graham et al. (2005) interview more than 400 executives in the US to 
determine the factors that drive reported earnings and disclosure decisions. Meeting or 
exceeding earnings benchmarks are seen as very important factors. Last year quarterly 
earnings and analyst consensus estimates are seen as two most important earnings 
benchmarks. Graham et al. (2005) interpret market reactions to small EPS misses as evidence 
of a market opinion that companies should be able to hit the targets. Further, the researchers 
suggest that not being able to find one or two cents to hit the target might even be interpreted 
as evidence of hidden problems at the firm. Iatridis and Kadorinis (2009) provide similar 
evidence from the UK. The researchers argue that if a company is to retain its status and 
prosperity, it is an absolute necessity to meet or exceed analysts’ earnings forecast. Findings 
from these two studies reflect the strong pressure that the markets create for companies to 
meet benchmarks. If benchmarks are not reached in the course of normal business operations, 
there is a huge pressure to act accordingly at least by the means of earnings management.  
 
Managers interviewed by Graham et al. (2005) also express a strong desire to report smooth 
earnings streams. In fact, the researchers are discovered to be willing to sacrifice long-term 
company value in exchange to smooth earnings. The desire is explained by arguing that 
smooth earnings result in lower cost of equity and debt capital as lower risk premiums are 
demanded for smooth earnings. Further, smooth earnings are believed to make it easier for 
analysts and investors to predict future earnings. At the same time, unpredictable earnings are 
thought to lead to a lower share price. The findings from Graham et al. (2005) indicate 
managers’ desire to report smooth earnings streams. Further, the findings indicate managers’ 
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belief of smooth earnings leading to a lower cost of equity capital. Contrary to this, McInnis 
(2010) suggest that there is no relation between smooth earnings and average stock market 
returns. In other words, the researcher suggests that smooth earnings streams do not lead to a 
lower cost of equity. Therefore, earnings smoothing might be exercised partly because of 
wrong beliefs, not because of achieving some concrete benefits for the company.  
 
2.3.3. Management’s personal incentives 
 
Managers may seek to manage earnings for bonus purposes in order to increase their own 
compensation. This is a traditional view in the area of earnings management literature and 
supporting evidence has been gained already during 1980’s (e.g. Healy 1985). A recent study 
from Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) suggests that bonus schedule arrangements still have 
an effect on earnings management practices. The researchers find that the use of discretionary 
accruals to manipulate reported earnings is more pronounced at firms where CEO’s total 
compensation is closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) also make an interesting notice: the use of accruals has increased 
significantly over the past 20 years, during which also an enormous increase in stock and 
option based executive compensation programs has taken place. However, there surely are 
several matters which may have affected the magnitude of accruals, compensation related 
earnings management activities just being one potential explanation.  
 
Managers’ personal motivations seem to have a connection to their desire of meeting earnings 
benchmarks. The survey from Graham et al. (2005) indicates that career concerns have a 
major effect on managers’ earnings management decisions. The managers are documented to 
share a view about labor market assessing their skill level based on short-run stock prices. 
Further, managers are suggested to have concerns about losing their jobs in the case of a stock 
price decline. Career concerns are even suggested to have a bigger effect on earnings 
management incentives than short-term compensation objectives. Additionally, stock market 
based desire to hit a target seems to be linked to personal incentives related career concerns. 
Stock market reactions and expectations provide managers with strong incentives to manage 
earnings. However, the managers seem to react to these pressures mainly because of 
endangering their future career if not doing so. (Graham et al. 2005) 
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There is evidence suggesting that managers might make different accounting choices at the 
different stages of their career. Dechow and Sloan (1991) argue that CEOs spend less on R&D 
expenditures during their final years in the office. Further, Pourciau (1993) provides evidence 
of big bath accounting in the context of executive changes. This refers to recording large 
write-offs and special items in the year the management changes and thus increasing earnings 
for following reporting periods. Results from these two studies can be evaluated from the 
viewpoint of managers’ personal incentives. Cutting R&D costs during the last years at the 
office increases earnings at that specific moment, but potentially harms long-term company 
value. On the other hand, the new management might be able to blame the decisions made by 
the old management for the big charges made.  Earnings for the subsequent periods, which 
may be managed upwards through accruals reversal, can be then interpreted as ability of the 
new management to produce profits. These practices might be exploited to improve the image 
of the new management at least in some situations. 
 
2.4. EARNINGS MANAGEMENT TYPES 
 
Earnings management research has traditionally focused on analyzing accruals manipulation, 
but recent research findings indicate that real earnings management might have become more 
dominating in today’s business environment (e.g. Li et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2005; 
Roychowdhury 2006).  
 
2.4.1. Accrual-based earnings management 
 
Manipulation practices 
Accrual-based earnings management is executed by altering the level of discretionary 
accruals. Accruals are the difference between reported earnings and cash flow from 
operations. Discretionary accruals are adjustments to cash flow which are selected by the 
management. Further, discretionary accruals may be chosen from an opportunity set of 
generally accepted accounting procedures allowed by legislation. Respectively, managers have 
discretion in determining the magnitude of several different accruals. For example, managers 
estimate the level of credit losses, warranty costs and inventory values. Further, decisions have 
to be made about timing and size of non-recurring and extraordinary items. (Healey 1985) 
 13 
 
Consequences   
Accruals modify timing of reported earnings and allow management to transfer earnings 
between periods (Healey 1985). Closely relating to this, accruals reversal is an important 
thing to remember while analyzing accrual-based earnings management (Scott 2009). Because 
of the reversal, future earnings are pushed downwards by the same amount that they have been 
raised during a specific reporting period. Respectively, Sloan (1996) has shown that earnings 
persistence is dependent on the relative magnitudes of the cash flow and accrual components 
of earnings. If accrual component of current earnings is relatively big, future earnings will be 
smaller as a result of accrual reversal. Respectively, when cash flow component of current 
earnings is relatively big, future earnings will be bigger compared to the situation with large 
current period accruals. 
 
2.4.2. Real earnings management 
 
Background 
Graham et al. (2005) find evidence suggesting that executives in the US are reluctant to 
employ within-legislation accounting discretion. Instead, managers admit taking real actions 
such as delaying maintenance or advertising expenditure and giving up positive NPV projects 
to manage earnings.  Roychowdhury (2006) points out that some real activities manipulation 
methods, like price discounts and reduction in discretionary expenditures, can be optimal 
actions in certain economic circumstances. However, such activities may be considered as 
earnings management if a manager engages in them more extensively than would be optimal 
(Roychowdhury 2006).  
 
Roychowdhury (2006) argues that real earnings management potentially causes a greater long-
term cost for a company than accruals manipulation. At the same time, the researcher suggests 
that managers might expect to bear a greater private cost in the short term when they engage in 
accrual-based earnings management. This argument can be used to explain proposed tendency 
of managers to prefer real earnings management. Managers might be choosing real earnings 
management based on their personal incentives, even though the company bears greater cost. 
(Roychowdhury 2006) 
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Manipulation practices 
Firms are found to manage earnings through manipulating operating, investing and financing 
activities (Xu et al. 2007). Respectively, real earnings management can affect company’s 
operating, investing and financing cash flows on its cash flow statement. One method to affect 
operating cash flow is to alter the level of discretionary expenditures. In the context of 
managers’ personal incentives discussion in chapter 2.3.3, it was shown that managers might 
make different R&D expenditure choices at different stages of their career. In addition to 
R&D expenditures, management may alter for example discretionary selling and 
administrative expenses to manage earnings (Gunny 2005).  
 
Other possibility to affect the level of operating cash flow is to manipulate sales and 
production functions. Jackson and Wilcox (2000) provide evidence suggesting that managers 
may use sales price reductions in the fourth quarter to meet financial reporting targets. Such 
action may increase sales and earnings for the period, but has a negative effect on gross profit 
percentage as a result of lower sales price. Roychowdhury (2006) shows that companies may 
engage in overproduction to achieve lower cost of goods sold figures. When production levels 
are higher, fixed overhead costs will be divided to a larger amount of units and total cost per 
unit declines. As cost of goods sold will be lower, operating cash flow and operating profit 
increase.  
 
Companies have been found to affect earnings also through investing decisions. For example, 
Bartov (1993) suggests that managers have a tendency to choose the timing of long-term asset 
sales in order to smooth earnings and to mitigate accounting based restrictions in debt 
covenants. Further, it is found that firms may use disposal of fixed assets and marketable 
securities to minimize the gap between management’s forecasts and reported earnings 
(Herrmann et al. 2003). When unmanaged earnings are below the forecast, a firm may 
increase earnings by selling fixed assets. Respectively, if unmanaged earnings are above the 
forecast, a company may choose to decrease earnings through asset purchases. 
 
Also financing activities related decisions have been found to be used to affect earnings 
figures.  Barton (2001) suggests that some companies use derivatives to smooth earnings. The 
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researcher finds evidence indicating that firms holding derivative portfolios have a lower 
absolute level of discretionary accruals. At the same time, Barton (2001) suggests that 
derivatives are a partial substitute for discretionary accruals when a company aims to smooth 
earnings. Hribar et al. (2006), on the other hand, argue that companies may use stock 
repurchases to increase earnings per share (EPS) figure when the unmanaged earnings are 
below analyst earnings forecast. After stock repurchase there are less shares in the market and 
EPS figure increases.  
 
In addition to manipulating cash flow figures inside one specific cash flow type, a company 
may use structuring transactions (Xu et al. 2007). This involves showing activities in wrong 
places on a company’s cash flow statement. For example, investing activities may be shown as 
a part of cash flow from operations. Consequently, cash flow statement may give a totally 
wrong picture about the true state of a company.  
 
Consequences 
Real earnings management includes deviating from an optimal operational plan to affect 
earnings figures (Ewert & Wagenhofer 2005). Not planning actions optimally may have a 
detrimental effect for a firm as management chooses not to act in order to maximize long-term 
company value. The survey from Graham et al. (2005) indicates that a major portion of all 
company executives might be ready to take real actions to manage earnings. About a half of 
the interviewed managers are found to be ready to reject a positive NPV project to meet an 
earnings target. Further, almost eighty percent of the surveyed managers implied to be ready to 
give up economic value in exchange to smooth earnings. Additionally, executives are found to 
face a trade-off between the short term need to “deliver earnings” and the long-term objective 
of making value-maximizing investment decisions. (Graham et al. 2005) 
 
Gunny (2005) examines the impact of real earnings management on a company’s future 
operating performance. The results indicate that real earnings management activities influence 
a firm’s subsequent operating performance significantly. Both future earnings and cash flows 
are shown to decline as a result of real activities manipulation. Findings from Gunny (2005) 
and Graham et al. (2005) indicate that real earnings management actions may have severe 
effects on a company’s performance.  
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2.5. DIFFERENT RESEARCH METHODS 
 
2.5.1. Models detecting accrual-based earnings management 
 
Several different models aim to detect accrual-based earnings management by analyzing total 
accruals. These models are normally used to generate non-discretionary accrual component of 
total accruals, thus dividing total accruals to non-discretionary and discretionary components. 
Generated discretionary accrual estimations are then used to evaluate whether earnings are 
managed. Research models normally require at least one parameter to be determined during an 
estimation period under which no systematic earnings management is assumed to exist. 
Methods evaluating aggregate accruals are mathematical methods which examine magnitude 
of total accruals. (Dechow et al. 1995) 
 
Dechow et al. (1995) test efficiency of five different models in detecting earnings 
management: the Healy (1985) model, the DeAngelo (1986) model, the Jones (1991) model, 
modified version of the Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) and the industry model (Dechow 
and Sloan 1991). The modified version of the Jones model is shown to have most power in 
detecting earnings management practices. (Dechow et al. 1995)  
 
The Healy (1985) model divides the sample into three groups: one group’s earnings are 
assumed to be managed upwards and two groups’ earnings downwards. Estimation for non-
discretionary accruals is achieved by comparing mean total accruals of the three groups with 
each other. The DeAngelo (1986) model is based on an assumption that no systematic 
earnings management exists during the first year. First year total accruals are used as an 
estimation of non-discretionary accruals. Taking different perspective to the topic, the industry 
model from Dechow and Sloan (1991) assumes that variation of determinants of non-
discretionary accruals is similar for companies in the same industry. This assumption is then 
applied to detect earnings management activities.  
 
The Jones model (1991) has been a dominating model in the academic literature. The Jones 
(1991) model is a regression model treating non-discretionary accruals as a constant. The 
model is adjusted with changes in total assets and total revenues, which is done to control the 
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effect of changes in the economic circumstances. Dechow et al. (1995) modify the Jones 
(1991) model by adjusting revenues with receivables for the period. This is argued to exclude 
the effect of management’s discretion in revenue recognition. As mentioned already earlier in 
this same subchapter, the modified Jones model is found to have most power in detecting 
earnings management. (Jones 1991; Dechow and Sloan 1991; Dechow et al. 1995) 
 
Earnings management has also been studied by examining specific accruals. These studies 
typically focus on a specific industry and benefit from institutional knowledge when 
examining the potential accruals behavior (McNichols 2000). For example, Scholes et al. 
(1990) concentrate on banking industry and study the connection between companies’ tax 
planning and investing decisions. The researchers examine companies’ holdings and interest 
expenses in the context of tax rule changes concerning deductibility of interest expenditures. 
Scholes et al. (1990) document changes in holdings of municipal bonds after tax legislation 
changes.  
 
2.5.2. Methods detecting real earnings management 
 
Academic research has aimed to detect real earnings management both via quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. Roychowdhury (2006) studies real earnings management by the 
means of quantitative analysis. More specifically, the researcher uses regression model to 
detect real earnings management conducted by sales manipulation, overproduction or altering 
the level of discretionary expenditures. Roychowdhury (2006) applies research models 
implemented by Dechow et al. (1998) to generate estimations for normal CFO (sales 
manipulation), production costs (overproduction) and discretionary expenditures 
(discretionary expenditures manipulation). Amount of earnings management is measured as 
difference between actual financial statement values and estimations generated by the 
regression analysis. (Roychowdhury 2006) 
 
Graham et al. (2005) study real earnings management in a qualitative study using survey and 
interviews as research methods. The study bases on five page long survey format which is 
directed to American CFOs. In addition, the researchers conduct 20 one-to-one interviews 
with companies’ senior executives. Interviews are linked to survey answers and provide 
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insight and depth for understanding the survey responses. Graham et al. (2005) argue that 
survey method enables adopting integrated perspective and evaluating trade-offs between 
different earnings management incentives. Further, the researchers suggest that the method 
allows taking wider perspective to earnings management without having to concentrate on one 
specific incentive per time. (Graham et al. 2005) 
 
Also Kepsu (2012) studies real earnings management by using qualitative research methods. 
The researcher applies case-study method and examines case company interviews conducted 
during a two year research period. In-depth case company interviews during a respectively 
long research period allow the researcher to analyze earnings management behavior both 
during the period when potential earnings management occurs and also after earnings are 
managed. Respectively, Kepsu (2012) suggests that the study is able to increase general 
understanding of earnings management by offering insights of earnings management behavior 
in the process of preparing corporate financial reports and the context in which earnings 
management takes place. (Kepsu 2012) 
 
2.5.3. Other research methods 
 
Unusual earnings distributions have been interpreted as evidence of earnings management 
practices. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) document frequencies of small earnings decreases 
and small losses to be unusually low. Further, the researchers discover that frequencies of 
small earnings increases and small profits are unusually high. The unusual distribution around 
zero earnings can be explained by companies managing earnings upwards to avoid reporting 
small losses. Respectively, similar abnormalities in the distribution of earnings decreases and 
increases can be explained by managers’ tendency to report a small earnings increase instead 
of a small decrease.  Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) use the prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky 1979) to explain their results. The theory suggests that largest gains from utility occur 
when moving from relative or absolute loss to gain. Therefore, earnings management practices 
benefit a company most when it is just able to move from loss to gain, or from relative loss to 
relative gain. Relative loss refers to reporting a lower earnings figure than during an earlier 
comparison period.   
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Academics have also evaluated the ability of stock markets to value different earnings 
components. Sloan (1996) suggests that investors are unable to fully understand different 
information contexts of cash flow and accruals components. With this, Sloan (1996) refers to 
differential earnings persistence of the earnings components. Also Xie (2001) has studied the 
same topic. The researcher finds evidence suggesting that stock markets overprice the portion 
of abnormal accruals which arises from managerial discretion. Dechow and Skinner (2000) 
interpret the findings from Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) as evidence of markets being fooled 
by simple earnings management practices. Findings from these three studies indicate that 
companies use accrual-based earnings management to mislead investors and, in fact, are 
successful in doing so.  
 
Myers et al. (2007) provide a different perspective to earnings management research. The 
researchers aim to gain evidence of earnings management by analyzing the momentum effect, 
which refers to the tendency of poorly performing stocks and well-performing stocks in one 
period to continue abnormal performance in following periods (Bodie et al. 2005). Myers et al. 
(2007) find 746 US firms that have reported increasing earnings strings of at least twenty 
quarters since 1962. The researchers argue that this is more than could be expected based on 
financial theories. The firms are perceived to enjoy abnormal returns of more than twenty 
percent annually during the first five years of these strings. Additionally, abnormal returns are 
observed to disappear after increasing earnings strings end. Myers et al. (2007) argue that 
abnormal returns motivate companies to maintain and extend increasing earnings strings by 
the means of earnings management.  
 
Kinnunen and Koskela (2003) document companies’ tendency to exercise cosmetic earnings 
management. Cosmetic earnings management involves small upward rounding of reported net 
income, which generates more than expected zeros and less than expected nines as second 
digit of earnings numbers. The rounding yields an earnings number that seems to be 
abnormally larger than it would be otherwise. Findings from Kinnunen and Koskela (2003) 
reflect companies’ ambition to make their earnings figures look better. 
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2.6. PRIOR EARNINGS MANAGEMENT RESEARCH IN FINLAND 
 
Finnish earnings management research has concentrated on examining earnings management 
before the mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 and IFRS period has gained less attention. 
Further, research is mainly focused on accrual-based earnings management. 
 
Kasanen et al. (1996) study earnings management in Finland during 1970-1989. Typical 
characters of this time period were debt dominated capital markets and concentrated 
ownership with restrictions on international ownership. The researchers provide evidence 
suggesting that earnings management in Finland during this period driven by an implicit 
contract between public companies and large institutional equity holders, who expect to 
receive a smooth dividend stream from their investment. Further, the results suggest use of 
earnings management to achieve earnings level that enables both dividend payout and tax 
minimization. 
 
Kallunki and Martikainen (1999a) examine earnings management in Finland during the same 
institutional environment as Kasanen et al. (1996), but by concentrating on years 1983-1989. 
The results suggest financially troubled companies to use accounting discretion to manage 
reported earnings upwards before a financial failure. Closely related to this, Sundgren (2007) 
studies earnings management in leveraged and non-leveraged Finnish companies during 1997-
2001. Study results suggest that leveraged companies are more likely to manage their earnings 
upwards than non-leveraged firms.  
 
Research findings concerning earnings management differences between Finnish public and 
private companies are controversial. Sundgren (2007) finds no significant difference in the 
tendency to manage earnings between public and private companies during 1997-2001. 
Results from Spohr (2004), on the other hand, suggest more income smoothing in private than 
public Finnish companies.  
 
Kallunki and Martikainen (2003) investigate whether the level of current earnings 
management can be used to predict future profitability of Finnish listed companies (research 
period 1988-1996). The results indicate a negative relationship between future profitability of 
a company and earnings management measure lagged by one year. Kallunki and Martikainen 
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(1999b) study also how Finnish public companies adjust their earnings management behavior 
based on industry-wide targets during 1988-1996. The results indicate that management of a 
firm takes into account the extent of earnings management of other firms operating in the 
same industry when managing reported earnings.  
 
As discussed earlier in subchapter 2.3.2, share issue situations may provide managers with 
incentives to use accounting discretion. Results from Spohr (2004) suggest entrepreneur 
companies to be more probable earnings managers in context of IPOs than institutionally 
owned companies (research period 1994-2000). Spohr (2004) has implemented his study by 
analyzing a sample of 56 companies that went public on the Helsinki Stock Exchange during 
1994-2000. Kinnunen et al. (2000), on the other hand, document earnings management in 
context of Finnish public company seasoned share issues during 1970-1989.  
 
Recent case study from Kepsu (2012) examines earnings management by analyzing case 
company interviews that are conducted during two year research period after IFRS adoption. 
The case company is a Finnish publicly quoted company listed on the OMX Nordic Exchange 
Helsinki. In-depth case company interviews indicate wide range earnings management 
incentives and behavior relating both to accrual-based and real earnings management. Kepsu 
(2012) observes potential earnings management in relation to accounting choices discretion 
(guarantee work provision and R&D expense activation), provision for employee bonuses, 
acquisition cost allocation and goodwill impairment testing. In addition, the researcher 
documents tendency of the case company CFO to use flexibility offered by IFRS and 
incentives to use managerial discretion to achieve earnings targets. Further, Kepsu (2012) 
observes motivations to use discretion carefully so that investors will not perceive it.  
 
Saastamoinen and Pajunen (2012) study the role of managerial discretion in goodwill write-off 
decisions in Finnish publicly quoted companies during 2005-2009. The researchers find 
evidence suggesting that goodwill impairment charges occur when earnings would have been 
negative already before the impairment, which is interpreted to indicate earnings bath type 
behavior. Further, the results from Saastamoinen and Pajunen (2012) suggest that a new CEO 
is more likely to impair goodwill than an old CEO. This is in line with international research 
evidence (Porciau 1993) on big bath accounting in context of executive changes. 
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3. IFRS ADOPTION 
 
All listed companies in European Union member countries have been required to apply IFRS 
since 2005. Also a large group of other countries like Canada, China, India, nearly all South 
American countries and several African countries either require or permit IFRS. In addition, 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has signaled to make preparations for 
incorporating IFRS into US financial reporting system. (Deloitte and Touch 2012) The main 
objective of this study is to explore the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management in 
Finnish publicly quoted companies. Consequently, it is beneficial to be aware of main 
approaches under IFRS and previous research findings to be able to evaluate the study results. 
The third chapter aims to familiarize the reader with the topic of IFRS. This is done in two 
subchapters. Main approaches under IFRS are first discussed in subchapter 3.1. Then, the 
reader is provided with a discussion of prior research findings of the effect of IFRS adoption 
on earnings management in subchapter 3.2. 
 
3.1. MAIN APPROACHES UNDER IFRS  
 
A central feature of IFRS is that standards are principles-based instead of rules-based. 
Principles-based systems use generic accounting standards and do not provide direct answers 
to all possible controversial issues in the form of detailed rules and guidance. Instead, 
principles-based systems refer to fundamental principles to be used as a basis of accounting 
decisions. However, as standards are based on generic principles rather than clear rules, 
companies are required to interpret the standards to determine the right accounting choice in 
every specific situation. Therefore, companies are left with flexibility in respect to making 
right accounting decisions in different situations. (Carmona & Trombetta 2008) 
 
In addition to the rules-based nature of the standards, fair value approach can be seen to be a 
central feature of IFRS framework. Fair value accounting refers to recognizing assets at 
balance sheet at their current and real value rather than at historical value. Therefore, balance 
sheet value of an asset may vary in different years according to fair value changes. Fair value 
accounting is relatively widely embodied to IFRS standards and fair value approach is a 
central feature of IFRS framework. (Ball, 2006) Local accounting legislation applied by 
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Finnish listed companies before 2005 has been based on theory emphasizing profit and loss 
statement (e.g. Pajunen and Saastamoinen 2010). IFRS, on the other hand, can be seen to be 
quite balance sheet centralized, as fair value principle is widely embodied to the standards. 
Therefore, IFRS has introduced a relatively big change to accounting practices among Finnish 
publicly quoted companies. 
 
Use of fair value principle can be reasoned by relevancy of fair value information in decision 
making for instance from investors’ viewpoint. However, the shift towards fair value 
application has also been criticized (e.g. Troberg, 2007, p: 46; Ball, 2006). Determining fair 
value for an asset is straightforward if a trustworthy market prize is available. However, this is 
not the case when relevant markets are illiquid or when public markets are not available at all. 
As Ball (2006) discusses, fair value accounting becomes ‘mark to model’ accounting when 
liquid market prices are not available, which refers to reporting estimates of market prices, not 
actual market prices. In such situation, there is a risk of using imperfect pricing models and 
imperfect estimates of model parameters. Fair value determination may also be affected by 
managers’ subjective views and opinions. Related to this, Naktabtee and Patpanichchot (2011) 
suggest that fair value accounting may in some situations actually make investors worse off 
(as compared to historical cost accounting values) due to inherent estimation errors and 
managerial manipulation. 
 
IFRS allows and requires fair value accounting in context of several balance sheet items, 
including both tangible and intangible assets. For example, property plant and equipment has 
to be valued at acquisition cost or at fair value (IAS 16). Fair value may be determined based 
on management’s subjective value in use (net present value) estimations if marked-based 
evidence or other reliable external valuation is not available. In case of revaluation, the change 
amount shall be credited directly to equity under revaluation surplus without booking the 
amount through income statement. Therefore, the revaluation discretion under IAS 16 cannot 
be used to affect earnings figures. IAS 36 allows impairment of assets and impairment reversal 
to recoverable amount in case of many asset types, for example goodwill (with reversal 
restrictions) and property plant and equipment. Recoverable amount should be determined 
based on higher of fair value less costs to sell or value in use. Further, impairment loss is 
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recognized as expense and impairment reversal as income in income statement (with the 
exception of revalued assets, where value changes are recognized directly in equity). As a 
result, impairment and impairment reversal clauses under IAS 38 may offer possibilities to 
manage earnings. Intangible assets with a market price (IAS 38), financial instruments (IAS 
39), investment property (IAS 40) and biological assets (IAS 41) can be mentioned as 
examples of other asset types that fair value approach is applied to at least in certain situations.   
 
In relation to goodwill accounting treatment, IFRS has introduced a major change as compared 
to prior Finnish legislation. The local Finnish GAAP requires goodwill to be amortized (in 
most cases) in five years (Accounting Act 1336/1997). Contrary to this, IFRS does not allow 
goodwill amortization but requires conducting annual impairment tests at cash-generating unit 
level (IAS 36). Respective impairment charges shall be booked if goodwill recoverable 
amount of a cash generating unit has declined below the carrying amount, i.e. amount 
recognized at balance sheet. As discussed above, the recoverable amount may be determined 
based on value in use (net present value) estimations, which leaves some discretion for the 
management. Therefore, managers may have discretion in determining necessity and size of 
the write-offs.  
 
Pajunen and Saastamoinen (2012) analyze Finnish auditors’ perceptions of goodwill 
accounting and earnings management under IFRS. Auditors are found to divide to two groups 
based on their opinions. The first group believes that management of listed Finnish companies 
behaves opportunistically in deciding the need of goodwill write-offs. The second group, on 
the other hand, has a more favorable attitude towards IFRS goodwill procedures and does not 
perceive listed companies’ management to behave opportunistically. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter (2.6), Saastamoinen and Pajunen (2012) find evidence indicating earnings 
bath type behavior in the form of tendency of Finnish listed companies to make goodwill 
impairment charges when earnings would have been negative already before the impairment. 
The results from both two studies imply that companies have some discretion in goodwill 
related accounting decisions and that the flexibility might be used opportunistically.  
 
 25 
 
As discussed in the chapter 2.6 concentrating on Finnish research, Kepsu (2012) studies 
earnings management with case study method in a Finnish publicly quoted company. The 
study reveals tendency of the case company CFO to use managerial discretion and flexibility 
offered by IFRS. Kepsu (2012, p: 56-57) describes CFO’s behavior as follows:  
 
“In the initial interview, the CFO stated that the flexibilities that the IFRS offer are and 
should be used. He found them natural and practical thing and admitted that he quite 
actively used to use managerial discretion as laid down according to the IFRS, in 
order to meet some thresholds.” 
 
The quotation highlights how using discretion offered by IFRS may be seen as a natural and 
acceptable behavior, not only as something unethical, as the tone relating to concepts 
“earnings management” or “earnings manipulation” might often be perceived. At the same 
time, the quotation indicates that using discretion offered by IFRS might be a part of normal 
decision making process at least in the surveyed case company.  
 
3.2. PRIOR RESEARCH FINDINGS   
 
Prior research in the area of the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management has focused 
on accounting quality and thus concentrates on accrual-based earnings management. Earlier 
research provides controversial results. While some studies suggest IFRS to have a positive 
influence on accounting quality and earnings management (e.g. Barth et al., 2008; Chen et al., 
2010), some other publications indicate increase in earnings management after IFRS (e.g. 
Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008).  
 
There are studies examining the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management among EU 
member countries with a multi-country sample. Callao and Jarne (2010) document increase in 
discretionary accruals after IFRS adoption and suggest intensified earnings management since 
the adoption. Chen et al. (2010), on the other hand, find evidence of smaller magnitude of 
absolute discretionary accruals, higher accruals quality and less earnings management toward 
a target after the adoption. Therefore, the two studies provide opposite evidence of the issue. 
As results from Callao and Jarne (2010) suggest an increase in accrual-based earnings 
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management after IFRS, findings from Chen et al. (2010) suggest the opposite by indicating 
decline in accrual-based earnings management after the adoption.  
 
Several studies employ single country setting by evaluating the effect of IFRS adoption on 
earnings management behavior among companies in a specific country. Barth et al. (2008) 
find evidence suggesting that German companies applying international accounting standards 
have generally less earnings management, more timely loss recognition and higher accounting 
item value relevance as comparing to firms applying domestic standards. Therefore, results 
suggest less earnings management under IFRS than local accounting standards. Contrary to 
Barth et al. (2008), Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) suggest that earnings management has not 
declined in Australia or the UK after IFRS adoption. Further, results from Jeanjean and 
Stolowy (2008) indicate an increase in the level of earnings management in France. Results 
from Pagletti (2009), on the other hand, are in line with Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008). Pagletti 
(2009) examines the effect of IFRS adoption on accrual-based earnings smoothing in Italian 
companies. The researcher documents increase in earnings management and decline in loss 
recognition timeliness.  
 
The effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management and accounting quality has been studied 
also in Asian context. Wang and Campbell (2012) find some evidence suggesting a decline in 
accrual-based earnings smoothing after IFRS adoption in Chinese listed companies. Contrary 
to this, Rudra (2012) finds that Indian firms adopting international standards are more likely to 
smooth earnings as comparing to non-adopting companies.  
 
As can be perceived based on the above discussion, prior research evidence provides 
substantially large variety of controversial results of the effects of IFRS on accounting quality 
and earnings management. The controversial results could be explained by the argument from 
Damant (2006), who suggests that the relative effect of IFRS adoption varies in relation to 
circumstances in the adopting country prior to change. At the same time, the researcher 
suggests that improvements resulting from the adoption might be small in such countries 
where accounting has been capital market oriented already before the adoption. Respectively, 
Damant (2006) suggests that the impact of IFRS might be huge in countries with very little 
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accounting expertise before the adoption. Soderstrom and Sun (2007), on the other hand, argue 
that cross-country differences in accounting quality are likely to remain also after IFRS 
adoption. The researchers reason this by arguing that accounting quality is a function of the 
firm’s overall institutional environment, including the legal and political system in a specific 
country. 
 
There is no prior research studying simultaneously the effect of IFRS adoption on accrual-
based and real earnings management. However, Cohen et al. (2009) have explored the effect 
of Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) on earnings management in the US from this viewpoint. The 
researchers document that accrual-based earnings management increased steadily from 1987 
until the passage of the SOX in 2002, which was followed by a significant decline after the 
passage of the SOX. Further, the researchers find that the level of real earnings management 
declined prior to SOX and increased significantly after the passage of SOX. Cohen et al. 
(2009) interpret these findings to indicate that companies switched from accrual-based to real 
earnings management methods after the change in legislation. The results from Cohen et al. 
(2009) can be evaluated in the light of findings from Li et al. (2011), who find evidence 
indicating that the level of real earnings management is higher in countries with stronger legal 
system. Based on this argument, it could be questioned whether an increase in the strength of 
country-level legal protection in context of the passage of SOX might have directed 
companies to prefer real activities manipulation against accrual-based earnings management 
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4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT, RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA 
 
The fourth chapter starts the empirical part of the study by concentrating on hypothesis 
development, research methods and data. Hypothesis development subchapter (4.1) first 
discusses the logic behind different earnings management hypotheses and introduces two 
research hypotheses of the study. This is followed by presenting research methods (4.2). 
Finally, the chapter is completed by discussing data used in the empirical analysis (4.3).  
 
4.1. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1.1. Logic behind research hypotheses  
 
As discussed in the introduction, earnings management will be studied by concentrating on 
accrual-based earnings management, sales manipulation and overproduction. Accrual-based 
earnings management refers to managing earnings figures by altering the level of 
discretionary accruals. Further, accrual-based earnings management leads to abnormally high 
or low accruals. Therefore, the difference between reported earnings and cash flow from 
operations is expected to be abnormally small or big. (Healy 1985) 
 
Sales manipulation can be seen as managers’ attempts to temporarily increase sales during a 
fiscal year by offering customers price discounts or more lenient credit terms. Companies 
using limited time price discounts at the end of a year are able to generate additional sales 
from the next period to the current year. When prices are changed back to the normal level, it 
is likely that increased sales volumes will disappear. Marginal profits will decline as a result of 
price discounts. However, if margins are positive, total earnings for the period will increase by 
price discount campaigns. As margins decline as a result of price discounts, production costs 
relative to sales level can be expected to be abnormally high for companies using this kind of 
manipulation. Further, declined marginal profits are also expected to lead to abnormally low 
CFO in relation to sales. Sales volumes can be boosted temporarily also by offering more 
lenient credit terms. When this is done at the end of reporting period, cash inflows from 
current period sales will be received during the following reporting period. This kind of sales 
manipulation can be expected to lead to lower current-period CFO. Also the relation between 
CFO and sales can be expected to be abnormally low. (Roychowdhury, 2006) 
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Manufacturing firms can use overproduction to increase earnings for a given period. As 
production levels increase, fixed overhead costs will be divided to larger number of units and 
fixed cost per one unit will decline. If marginal unit cost will not increase at the same time, 
total cost per unit will decline. This will cause also reported cost of goods sold (COGS) to 
decline and increase operating margins and reported earnings for the period. However, 
additional production and holding costs from the overproduced items will affect cash flows of 
the period.  Thus, CFO will be lower than what is expected given the sales level. Further, the 
incremental marginal costs incurred in producing the additional inventories will result in as 
higher annual production costs relative to sales. Production costs will be defined as the sum of 
COGS and change in inventory in order to take the additional inventories into account. 
(Roychowdhury, 2006) 
 
I will investigate patterns in total accruals, cash flow from operations (CFO) and production 
costs to detect changes in the level of earnings management. Respectively, I will focus on 
three manipulation methods and their effects on the abnormal levels of the three variables: 
 
1. Accrual manipulation, which refers to altering the level of discretionary accruals 
2. Sales manipulation, that is, accelerating the timing of sales and/or generating 
additional unsustainable sales through increased price discounts or more lenient credit 
terms 
3. Overproduction, which refers to increasing production to report lower COGS  
 
4.1.2. The effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management practices 
 
The first objective of this study is to examine whether mandatory IFRS adoption has affected 
earnings management practices among Finnish publicly quoted companies. The first 
hypothesis is tripartite and is defined as follows: 
 
H1a:  There is a difference in the level of accrual-based earnings management 
between FAS and IFRS.  
H1b:  There is a difference in the level of sales manipulation between FAS and IFRS. 
H1c:  There is a difference in the level of overproduction between FAS and IFRS. 
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4.1.3. Annual changes in earnings management 
 
The second objective of this study is to examine whether there are annual changes in the level 
of earnings management in Finnish publicly quoted companies that do not relate to IFRS 
adoption. The second hypothesis is tripartite and is defined as follows: 
 
H2a: There are changes in the level of accrual-based earnings management in 
different years which are not explained by IFRS adoption. 
H2b: There are changes in the level of sales manipulation in different years which 
are not explained by IFRS adoption. 
H2c: There are changes in the level of overproduction in different years which are 
not explained by IFRS adoption. 
 
4.2. METHODOLOGY 
 
4.2.1. Estimation models 
 
Accrual-based earnings management  
The Jones (1991) model will be used as the main research model applied to detect accrual-
based earnings management. The model is a regression model basing on an assumption that 
nondiscretionary accruals are constant. It attempts to control the effect of changes in a firm’s 
economic circumstances on nondiscretionary accruals. The Jones model for total accruals in 
an event year is: 
 
)/()/()/1(/ 1312111   ttttttt APPEASAATA  ,   (1) 
where  
TAt  = total accruals in year t 
At-1  = total assets at t–1 
∆St  = sales change in year t (St-St1) 
PPEt  = property plant and equipment in year t  
 
Main empirical analysis is implemented by running regression separately for different 
subsamples and by evaluating differences in the ability of the applied research model to 
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explain variation in dependent variable values. An increase (decline) in the ability of the 
research model to explain variation in dependent variable is interpreted to reflect a decline 
(increase) in the level of earnings management. Regression residual is considered as 
estimation of earnings management and empirical analysis will base on evaluating adjusted R
2
 
values for different subsamples. 
  
Robustness of annual accrual manipulation analysis is tested by applying the DeAngelo (1986) 
model. The model analyzes accrual-based earnings management by evaluating differences in 
yearly total accruals and assumes that first differences have an expected value of zero under 
the null hypothesis of no earnings management. The estimation period for nondiscretionary 
accruals is limited to previous year’s figures and total accruals for last period are used as a 
measure of nondiscretionary accruals. The DeAngelo (1986) model for nondiscretionary 
accruals is: 
 
1 tt TANDA ,         (2) 
where 
NDAt  = normal discretionary accruals at t 
TAt  = total accruals at t–1. 
 
The DeAngelo (1986) model measures nondiscretionary accruals without error if 
nondiscretionary accruals are constant over time and discretionary accruals have a mean of 
zero during the estimation period. However, if nondiscretionary accruals are not constant and 
change from period to period, the model is not effective in measuring nondiscretionary 
accruals.  
 
Robustness of yearly accruals manipulation analysis will also be tested also by evaluating 
annual changes in average variable values. 
 
Sales manipulation  
Sales manipulation will be evaluated by following Roychowdhury (2006) and thus by 
applying the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998). The model expresses normal cash 
 32 
 
flow from operations as a linear function of sales in the current period. Regression will be run 
for the following model: 
 
)/()/()/1(/ 1312111   ttttttt ASASAACFO  ,     (3) 
where 
CFOt  = cash flow from operations in year t 
At-1  = total assets at t–1 
St  = sales in year t  
∆St  = sales change in year t (St–St-1).  
 
As in case of accrual-based earnings management, main empirical analysis will be 
implemented by evaluating the ability of the applied regression model to explain variation in 
dependent variable values. Further, regression residual is considered as estimation of earnings 
management and empirical analysis of the study will base on evaluating adjusted R
2
 values for 
different subsamples.  
 
Robustness of annual sales manipulation analysis will be tested by analyzing differences in 
yearly CFO-to-sales and production cost-to-sales ratios. As sales manipulation occurs, sales 
levels are increased temporarily by offering price discounts and/or more lenient credit terms. 
Both procedures may be used to generate sales from next period to the current one. As long as 
sales margins are positive, current period earnings will increase as a result of these actions. In 
case of price discount campaigns, marginal profits can be expected to decline. This causes 
production costs to be abnormally high in relation to sales level and CFO to be abnormally 
low in relation to sales. As sales is increased temporarily via more lenient credit terms, sales 
manipulation is expected to lead to lower current period CFO in relation to sales, as inflows 
may be delayed to the following reporting period. (Roychowdhury 2006) Based on above 
viewpoints, it is suggested that annual changes in the level of sales manipulation can be 
evaluated by analyzing yearly differences in CFO-to-sales and production cost-to-sales 
figures.  
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Overproduction 
As sales manipulation, also overproduction will be evaluated by following Roychowdhury 
(2006) and by applying the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998). As discussed earlier, 
production costs will be determined as follows: 
 
ttt INVCOGSPROD   ,        (4) 
where 
PRODt = production costs in year t 
COGSt = cost of goods sold in year t  
∆INVt          = change in inventory in year t (INVt–INVt-1). 
 
Further, the model for normal COGS will be determined as: 
 
)/()/1(/ 12111   ttttt ASAACOGS  ,      (5) 
where 
COGSt  = cost of goods sold in year t  
At-1  = total assets at t–1 
St  = sales in year t.  
 
And the model for normal inventory growth will be determined as: 
 
)/()/()/1(/ 1131.2111   ttttttt ASASAAINV  ,   (6) 
where, 
∆INVt  = change in inventory in year t (INVt–INVt-1) 
At-1  = total assets at t–1 
∆St  = sales change in year t (St–St-1)  
∆St-1  = sales change in year t-1 (St-1–St-2).  
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As production cost is determined as a sum of COGS and change in inventory, normal 
production costs can be estimated by using above equations (5) and (6) to run regression as 
follows: 
 
)/()/()/()/1(/ 114131211   tttttttttt ASASASAAPROD  ,  (7) 
where 
PRODt  = production costs in year t 
At-1  = total assets at t–1 
St  = sales in year t 
∆St  = sales change in year t (St–St-1)  
∆St-1  = sales change in year t-1 (St-1–St-2).  
 
The above equation for normal production costs will be used in the empirical analysis in order 
to analyze changes in the level of overproduction. As in context of accrual-based earnings 
management and sales manipulation, main analysis will be implemented by evaluating the 
ability of the applied regression model to explain variation in dependent variable values. 
Further, regression residual is considered as estimation of earnings management and empirical 
analysis will base on evaluating adjusted R
2
 values for different subsamples. 
 
Robustness of annual overproduction analysis will be tested by analyzing differences in annual 
CFO-to-sales and production cost-to-sales ratios. When production level is increased fixed 
overhead costs will be divided to larger number of units and fixed cost per one unit will 
decline. This will cause reported cost of goods sold (COGS) to decline, which increases 
reported earnings for the period. However, additional production and holding costs from the 
overproduced items will affect cash flows of the period.  CFO will be lower than what could 
be expected given the sales level. Further, incremental marginal costs incurred in producing 
the additional inventories will result in as higher annual production costs than could be 
expected given the sales level. Production costs will be defined as the sum of COGS and 
change in inventory in order to take the additional inventories into account. (Roychowdhury 
2006) Based on above viewpoints, it is suggested that annual changes in the level of 
overproduction can be evaluated by analyzing yearly differences in CFO-to-sales and 
production cost-to-sales figures. 
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4.2.2. Adjusted R2 statistic 
 
The main empirical analysis is conducted by applying OLS Linear Regression. Further, the 
main analysis is executed by evaluating differences in the magnitudes of adjusted R
2
 values. 
Adjusted R
2
 is a goodness of fit statistic of regression model and measures the ability of 
explanatory variables to explain variations in dependent variable values (Brooks, 2008, p. 
107). An increase in the explaining ability of the model results as an increase in adjusted R
2
. 
When financial statement figures are manipulated, one can expect adjusted R
2
 to be lower than 
what it would be in case of unmanaged accounting information. Therefore, changes in the 
level of adjusted R
2
 values may be used to evaluate differences in earnings management. The 
main empirical analysis will be implemented by comparing adjusted R
2
 values for different 
subsamples in order to observe differences in the levels of earnings management between the 
subsamples. An increase (decline) in adjusted R
2
 value will be interpreted to reflect a decline 
(increase) in the level of earnings management.  
 
4.2.3. Research variables 
 
Total accruals will be determined as the difference between net income available to common 
stockholders and cash flow from operations (CFO). Further, CFO represents cash flow from 
operations as reported in the statement of cash flows. Production costs will be defined as the 
sum of COGS and change in inventory. As explained by Roychowdhury (2006), this kind of 
definition will generate theoretical “production” costs also for non-manufacturing firms. At 
the same time, Roychowdhury (2006) argues that total production costs might be better in 
reflecting the effects of real activities than bare COGS. The researcher argues that for example 
accrual manipulation striving towards lower reported COGS through the inventory account 
will not be reflected in reported COGS figure, but might be taken into account when inventory 
change is evaluated as a part of production costs. This might be the case for example when 
write-off of obsolete inventory is delayed.  
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4.3. DATA 
 
The empirical part of the study is based on data collected from Thomson One Banker 
Worldscope database. Sample consists of firms quoted in the Helsinki Stock Exchange 
between 2001 and 2010. The sample is restricted to nonfinancial firms. Therefore, companies 
representing banks, financial institutions and insurance companies (two-digit SIC codes 60-
67) are excluded from the sample. It is required that each firm-year observation has the data 
necessary to calculate the earnings management proxies, which are employed in a particular 
analysis. Thus, all relevant variable values are required for a company to be included in the 
sample. Available variable values for different companies vary depending on the year. As the 
three estimation models use different variables in the analysis, a company may be included to 
the sample when analyzing one manipulation method but excluded when analyzing another. 
For example, a company might be included in sales manipulation analysis but excluded in case 
of production manipulation evaluation. The final sample includes 952 firm-year observations 
for accrual-based earnings management analysis, 1005 for sales manipulation and 931 for 
overproduction. 
 
The main objective of this study is to study whether mandatory IFRS adoption in 2005 has 
affected earnings management practices among Finnish publicly quoted companies. In Finland 
companies were able to early adopt IFRS voluntarily already before the mandatory adoption in 
2005. Some companies adopted IFRS voluntarily already in 2003 or 2004. Therefore, the 
effect of the adoption cannot be evaluated directly by comparing yearly results for periods 
from 2001 to 2004 and from 2005 to 2010. To be able to examine the effect of IFRS adoption 
on earnings management, observations are divided to two subsamples according to accounting 
regulation. Like financial statement data, also information of used accounting standards for 
each company and each year is retrieved from Thompson One Banker Worldscope database. 
Table 1 presents number of firm-year observations for FAS and IFRS subsamples.  
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TABLE 1: NUMBER OF FIRM-YEAR OBSERVATIONS FOR FAS AND IFRS 
SUBSAMPLES 
 
This table presents the amount of firm year observations for FAS and IFRS subsamples separately for different 
earnings management types.  
 
 
 
The second objective of this study is to study yearly differences in the level of earnings 
management that do not relate to IFRS adoption. Availability of relevant data varies also 
during different years. Table 2 presents number of firm-year observations for different years.  
 
TABLE 2: NUMBER OF FIRM-YEAR OBSERVATIONS FOR YEARLY 
SUBSAMPLES 
 
This table presents amount of firm-year observations for yearly sub-samples separately for different earnings 
management types.  
 
 
  
Accruals 
Manipulation Sales Manipulation Overproduction
Nr. of firm-year observations
FAS 348 372 339
IFRS 604 633 592
Total 952 1005 931
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Nr. of firm-year observations
Accruals Manipulation 75 90 92 95 94 98 100 102 102 104
Sales Manipulation 93 94 97 100 102 103 103 105 105 106
Overproduction 73 89 91 93 95 96 95 100 100 100
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5. RESULTS 
 
The fifth chapter continues empirical part of the study by presenting and analyzing research 
results. The chapter starts by presenting descriptive statistics (5.1). This is followed by 
discussing regression analysis results in two separate subchapters, which are grouped 
according to the two objectives of the study. Results relating to the effect of IFRS adoption on 
earnings management are first analyzed in subchapter 5.2. After this, results from annual 
earnings management analysis are presented in subchapter 5.3. In the end, the reader is 
provided with a discussion of robustness test results (5.4).  
 
5.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented according to the twofold structure of the study. First, non-
grouped statistics are presented in order to illustrate the whole data (5.1.1). After this, 
subsample descriptive statistics are presented separately for accounting regulation (5.1.2) and 
annual subsamples (5.1.3) to enable evaluating possible differences between the subsamples. 
All descriptive statistics are based on whole sample information and outliers are not excluded 
from the analysis. 
 
5.1.1. Non-grouped descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 presents non-grouped full sample descriptive statistics.  
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TABLE 3: FULL SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This table presents descriptive statistics (m. €) for the whole sample without excluding potential outliers. 
Variable values are scaled by previous period total assets. Regression is run for scaled variable values, which 
makes it important to present descriptive statistics for scaled values.  
 
 
 
5.1.2. FAS and IFRS descriptive statistics 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics separately for FAS and IFRS subsamples. After this, 
Figure 1 presents a comparison of average variable values between FAS and IFRS 
subsamples.  
N
25th 
Percentile Mean Median
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
deviation
CFO 1008 35.8 e
-3
78.1 e
-3
90.7 e
-3
147.8 e
-3
174.4 e
-3
COGS 983 594.6 e
-3
958.8 e
-3
869.4 e
-3
1,270,6 e
-3
557.7 e
-3
Net Income 989 3.4 e
-3
28.7 e
-3
49.2 e
-3
98.7 e
-3
187.5 e
-3
Inventory 973 28.8 e
-3
154.9 e
-3
130.1 e
-3
228.2 e
-3
149.8 e
-3
Production Cost 946 582.2 e
-3
979.8 e
-3
886.0 e
-3
1,303.9 e
-3
581.9 e
-3
Property, Plant and Equipment 972 251.2 e
-3
623.1 e
-3
466.3 e
-3
953.9 e
-3
486.0 e
-3
Receivables 1008 130.2 e
-3
235.5 e
-3
204.7 e
-3
297,6 e
-3
158.6 e
-3
Sales 1009 910.2 e
-3
1,309.4 e
-3
1,234.3 e
-3
1,708.1 e
-3
601.2 e
-3
Total Accruals 988 -92.2 e
-3
-50.9 e
-3
-48.3 e
-3
-333.0 e
-3
124.8 e
-3
Total Assets 1009 936.3 e
-3
1,090.4 e
-3
1,020.1 e
-3
1,129.9 e
-3
457.4 e
-3
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TABLE 4: FAS AND IFRS SUBSAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Panel A: FAS Subsample Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics (m. €) for FAS subsample. Variable values are scaled by previous period 
total assets. Regression is run for scaled variable values, which makes it important to present descriptive statistics 
for scaled values.  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: IFRS Subsample Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics (m. €) for IFRS subsample. Variable values are scaled by previous period 
total assets. Regression is run for scaled variable values, which makes it important to present descriptive statistics 
for scaled values.  
 
 
 
 
  
  
N
25th 
Percentile Mean Median
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
deviation
FAS subsample statistics
CFO 372 38.9 e
-3
75.9 e
-3
94.8 e
-3
147.3 e
-3
174.3 e
-3
COGS 355 579.3 e
-3
962.2 e
-3
853.8 e
-3
1,267.5 e
-3
583.9 e
-3
Net Income 365 3.4 e
-3
19.4 e
-3
44.2 e
-3
87.1 e
-3
202.8 e
-3
Inventory 360 28.9 e
-3
150.0 e
-3
116.1 e
-3
225.8 e
-3
142.2 e
-3
Production Cost 345 581.2 e
-3
978.9 e
-3
871.5 e
-3
1,299.5 e
-3
602.9 e
-3
Property, Plant and Equipment 355 280.2 e
-3
626.8 e
-3
483.2 e
-3
967.5 e
-3
473.0 e
-3
Receivables 372 126.1 e
-3
229.4 e
-3
119.1 e
-3
227.6 e
-3
167.6 e
-3
Sales 372 887.7 e
-3
1,294.6 e
-3
1,244.1 e
-3
1,692.6 e
-3
604.3 e
-3
Total Accruals 365 -108.1 e
-3
-57.5 e
-3
-60.0 e
-3
-22.9 e
-3
-151.3 e
-3
Total Assets 372 908.4 e
-3
1,042.0 e
-3
984.5 e
-3
1,086.4 e
-3
431.8 e
-3
N
25th 
Percentile Mean Median
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
deviation
IFRS subsample statistics
CFO 633 33.6 e
-3
79.2 e
-3
89.0 e
-3
148.0 e
-3
174.8 e
-3
COGS 627 597.2 e
-3
956.5 e
-3
887.7 e
-3
1,274.5 e
-3
543.1 e
-3
Net Income 620 15.5 e
-3
66.6 e
-3
80.6 e
-3
144.3 e
-3
179.1 e
-3
Inventory 609 29.0 e
-3
157.9 e
-3
134.5 e
-3
233.6 e
-3
154.2 e
-3
Production Cost 600 581.9 e
-3
980.2 e
-3
890.2 e
-3
1,305.6 e
-3
570.5 e
-3
Property, Plant and Equipment 617 243.5 e
-3
621.0 e
-3
462.0 e
-3
952.7 e
-3
493.7 e
-3
Receivables 632 132.4 e
-3
238.6 e
-3
208.9 e
-3
310.4 e
-3
153.3 e
-3
Sales 633 923.2 e
-3
1,317.3 e
-3
1,237.7 e
-3
1,727.0 e
-3
600.9 e
-3
Total Accruals 620 -82.9 e
-3
-46.8 e
-3
-41.7 e
-3
-0.1 e
-3
-106.4 e
-3
Total Assets 633 1,119.2 e
-3
1,041.5 e
-3
471.0 e
-3
959.1 e
-3
1,158.3 e
-3
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FIGURE 1: AVERAGE VARIABLE VALUES FOR FAS AND IFRS SUBSAMPLES 
Panel A: Non-Scaled Average Value Comparison between FAS and IFRS Subsamples 
This figure presents average values (m. €) for all variables separately for FAS and IFRS subsamples. Averages 
are calculated based on non-scaled variable values. Because of this, the comparison reflects differences in the 
absolute variable magnitudes between the two subsamples.  
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Scaled Average Value Comparison between FAS and IFRS Subsamples 
This figure presents average values for all variables separately for FAS and IFRS subsamples. Averages are 
calculated based on variable values that are scaled by previous year total assets. Thus, the comparison reflects 
differences in relative variable sizes between the two subsamples. Regression is run for scaled variable values, 
which makes it important to present descriptive statistics for scaled values.  
 
 
 
As can be seen from Panel A of Figure 1, absolute average values are larger for IFRS than for 
FAS subsample in case of all other variables except total accruals. However, as can be 
observed based on comparison in Panel B of Figure 1, averages of scaled variable values are 
roughly the same for both two subsamples. It seems that change in accounting regulation has 
not had a major effect on the relation between research variables and previous year total 
CFO COGS
Net
Income
INV Prod. Cost PPE REC Sales
Total
Accruals
Total
Assets
FAS 132 904.7 58.2 121.9 911.6 949.7 197.9 1189 -69.8 1135.3
IFRS 151.1 1235.8 95.4 199.4 1301.1 1179.8 282.7 1668.7 -58.3 1589.9
-500
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
m. €
CFO COGS
Net
Income
INV Prod. Cost PPE REC Sales
Total
Accruals
Total
Assets
FAS 0.08 0.96 0.02 0.15 0.98 0.63 0.23 1.29 -0.06 1.04
IFRS 0.08 0.96 0.03 0.16 0.98 0.62 0.24 1.32 -0.05 1.04
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
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assets. The relative size of the variables seems to be quite constant. Average total accruals are 
negative for both two subsamples. Magnitude of absolute average total accruals is about ten 
million euro bigger for FAS than for IFRS subsample. Therefore, IFRS adoption could be 
suggested to have restricted the level of total accruals.  
 
5.1.3. Annual descriptive statistics 
 
This subsection presents descriptive statistics for the ten yearly subsamples. In addition, the 
reader is provided with an analysis of average value development for selected research 
variables. Table 5 presents yearly average values for the study variables. Figure 2 presents 
yearly development of average total assets and sales for the sample period.   
 
TABLE 5: AVERAGE YEARLY VARIABLE VALUES 
 
Panel A: Non-Scaled Average Values for Yearly Subsamples 
This table presents yearly averages (m. €) that have been calculated based on absolute non-scaled variable values. 
The table enables evaluating annual differences in absolute variable average values.  
 
 
 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average value (m. €)
CFO 163.3 159.1 151.5 134.0 126.5 135.7 173.9 117.1 143.4 135.2
COGS 1,118.8 1,038.3 998.0 1,043.8 1,047.9 1,171.1 1,266.0 1,280.9 1,047.8 1,124.2
Net Income 64.9 61.2 61.5 97.0 84.0 113.6 138.1 78.2 30.3 74.8
Inventory 144.4 139.0 135.1 143.0 157.3 176.2 203.2 214.6 179.7 198.8
Product. Cost 1,134.1 987.2 1,051.3 1,093.3 1,093.6 1,225.5 1,388.1 1,330.0 1,062.7 1,187.4
PPE 1,271.8 1,138.0 1,085.2 1,071.5 1,088.3 1,093.8 1,048.5 1,035.0 1,056.1 1,118.6
Receivables 233.8 240.6 226.7 219.2 230.9 257.8 307.5 282.9 239.3 259.4
Sales 1,292.2 1,395.4 1,360.6 1,395.0 1,392.9 1,574.9 1,719.1 1,749.8 1,409.7 1,527.2
Total Accruals -91.1 -93.7 -87.4 -36.1 -43.0 -21.6 -36.6 -41.5 -114.8 -63.1
Total Assets 1,343.0 1,375.5 1,300.1 1,274.5 1,302.5 1,370.7 1,530.8 1,568.5 1,475.7 1,592.9
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Panel B: Scaled Average Values for Yearly Subsamples 
This table presents yearly averages (m. €) that have been calculated based on variable values that are scaled by 
previous year total assets. Regression is run for scaled variable values, which makes it important to present 
descriptive statistics for scaled values.   
 
 
 
FIGURE 2: YEARLY DEVELOPMENT OF AVERAGE TOTAL ASSETS AND SALES 
This table presents yearly development for average total assets and sales. Averages are calculated based on 
absolute non-scaled values, because the figure aims to reflect annual differences in variable averages during the 
sample period.  
 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 2, yearly development of average sales and total assets is quite 
similar during the sample period. The level of average values is quite constant from 2001 to 
2005 and no major fluctuations occur. In 2005, the year of mandatory IFRS adoption, the 
steady development ends. After this, average values increase steadily from 2005 to 2008. The 
slope is followed by a decline in 2009, as the averages decline from previous year. Especially 
sales average drops heavily and comes down roughly about 300 m. €. Change in financial 
situation is reflected also in the development of Gross Domestic Product of Finland, which 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Average value (m. €)
CFO 69.1 e
-3
51.5 e
-3
87.0 e
-3
98.6 e
-3
95.0 e
-3
80.6 e
-3
92.1 e
-3
80.4 e
-3
73.0 e
-3
52.5 e
-3
COGS 846.1 e
-3
940.7 e
-3
953.8 e
-3
1,057.1 e
-3
1,121.6 e
-3
1,060.4 e
-3
1,042.2 e
-3
955.4 e
-3
763.0 e
-3
836.3 e
-3
Net Income 17.2 e
-3
-15.0 e
-3
7.2 e
-3
71.2 e
-3
63.8 e
-3
39.3 e
-3
62.0 e
-3
37.8 e
-3
-8.5 e
-3
8.1 e
-3
Inventory 145.0 e
-3
149.5 e
-3
146.0 e
-3
149.5 e
-3
159.9 e
-3
188.4 e
-3
166.7 e
-3
159.2 e
-3
129.3 e
-3
154.3 e
-3
Product. Cost 847.7 e
-3
964.1 e
-3
970.6 e
-3
1,077.2 e
-3
1,140.3 e
-3
1,120.7 e
-3
1,086.1 e
-3
978.1 e
-3
744.1 e
-3
855.2 e
-3
PPE 610.2 e
-3
629.3 e
-3
626.6 e
-3
640.6 e
-3
646.4 e
-3
682.2 e
-3
610.5 e
-3
576.8 e
-3
566.2 e
-3
644.6 e
-3
Receivables 222.9 e
-3
226.4 e
-3
230.8 e
-3
234.6 e
-3
263.4 e
-3
273.1 e
-3
263.6 e
-3
216.2 e
-3
183.3 e
-3
239.8 e
-3
Sales 1,197.1 e
-3
1,212.4 e
-3
1,295.0 e
-3
1,428.1 e
-3
1,483.1 e
-3
1,454.9 e
-3
1,406.2 e
-3
1,320.3 e
-3
1,052.1 e
-3
1,238.0 e
-3
Total Accruals  -53.3 e
-3
 -68.9 e
-3
 -79.6 e
-3
-28.7 e
-3
-33.7 e
-3
 -42.3 e
-3
-29.3 e
-3
 -44.8 e
-3
 -83.5 e
-3
 -46.6 e
-3
Total Assets 1,022.0 e
-3
1,049.3 e
-3
1,050.2 e
-3
1,041.1 e
-3
1,155.1 e
-3
1,278.8 e
-3
1,195.8 e
-3
1,041.2 e
-3
952.4 e
-3
1,108.1 e
-3
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
m. € Sales Total Assets
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turns to a decline after increasing for fifteen years since 1994 and comes down with 8.4 
percent in 2009 (Statistics Finland 2012). In 2010 average sales and total assets turn to an 
incline after one year slump. As average total assets increase barely above the level of 2008, 
sales average remains at a clearly lower level when comparing to the peak year of 2008. The 
effect of financial downturn around 2009 is reflected also in the development of net income, 
CFO and total accrual averages. Figure 3 presents yearly development these three variables 
during the research period.  
 
FIGURE 3: YEARLY DEVELOPMENT OF AVERAGE NET INCOME, CFO AND 
TOTAL ACCRUALS 
 
This table presents yearly development of average net income, CFO and total accruals. Averages are calculated 
based on absolute non-scaled values, because the figure aims to reflect annual differences in variable averages 
during the sample period.  
 
 
 
As can be seen based on Figure 3, development of net income and total accrual averages is 
quite similar during the research period. Without one exception year (2007) the two variables 
develop to the same direction, i.e. both either increase or decline as comparing to previous 
period. Average CFO develops quite similarly than net income and total accruals in the 
beginning of the research period, but differences can be observed during 2009 and 2010.  
 
As can be observed based on Figure 3, the development of average variable values is quite 
steady from 2001 to 2005, i.e. until the year of mandatory IFRS adoption. This phase is 
followed by an upswing of couple of years, which in turn is followed by a steep decline 
around 2008 and 2009 as financial downturn takes place in Finland. Especially average net 
income and total accruals decline steeply. Development of the three variables during 2009 
-150
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-50
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100
150
200
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differs clearly from other years. As net income and total accrual averages decline heavily from 
previous year, average CFO turns for an increase after only one year decline (from 2007 to 
2008). In 2010 average net income and total accruals turn for an increase. CFO, on the other 
hand, stays roughly about the same level than in 2010.  
 
5.2. EFFECT OF IFRS ADOPTION ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
 
The main objective of this study is to examine whether IFRS adoption has affected earnings 
management practices in Finnish publicly quoted companies. This subchapter concentrates on 
presenting and analyzing the results related to this objective.  
 
FAS and IFRS subsamples are pooled samples that contain observations for several years. 
Further, there are yearly differences in average dependent variables values, i.e. total accruals, 
cash flow from operations and production costs. Because of this, yearly variation is controlled 
by adding year dummy variables to the research model. Dummy variables of the selected 
subsample control years are left out of the model. First sample years are used as control years 
in case of both two subsamples. Therefore, control years are 2001 (for FAS subsample) and 
2005 (for IFRS subsample).  
 
As discussed in the context of research methods, the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings 
management is studied by evaluating differences in coefficient of determination (adjusted R
2
) 
values between FAS and IFRS subsamples. Adjusted R
2
 is a goodness of fit statistic of 
regression model and measures the ability of explanatory variables to explain variations in 
dependent variable (Brooks, 2008, p. 107). An increase in the explaining ability of the model 
results as an increase in adjusted R
2
 value. When financial statement figures are manipulated, 
one can expect adjusted R
2
 value to be lower than what it would be in case of unmanaged 
accounting information. Based on this, differences in the level of adjusted R
2
 values between 
the two subsamples are evaluated to detect differences in earnings management practices 
among FAS and IFRS observations. Table 6 presents regression statistics for the two 
subsamples.  
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TABLE 6: REGRESSION STATISTICS FOR FAS AND IFRS SUBSAMPLES 
This table presents regression statistics for FAS and IFRS subsamples. Outliers have been eliminated from the 
sample before running the regression. Outliers are eliminated manually based on analyzing Cook’s Distance 
values. P-values statistically significant at five percent or better are presented boldface.  
 
 
 
 
In case of accrual-based earnings management, adjusted R
2 
value is lower for IFRS (0.036) 
than for FAS (0.045) subsample. In percentages, coefficient of determination value is about 20 
percent lower for IFRS than for FAS observations. The difference in adjusted R
2
 values can be 
suggested to imply a higher level of accrual-based earnings management among FAS than 
IFRS observations.  
 
The difference between FAS and IFRS samples can also be evaluated with independent 
samples t-test, which analyzes whether the difference between observed mean residual values 
(Residual Mean Square) of the two samples is statistically significant. The results from 
independent samples t-test are presented in Table 6. In case of accrual-based earnings 
management, the difference is statistically significant at five percent probability level (p-value 
Accruals 
Manipulation
Sales 
Manipulation Overproduction
Adjusted R-square
FAS 0.045 0.200 0.905
IFRS 0.036 0.116 0.847
F-value (prob.)
FAS 3.738 (0.001) 16.412 (0.000) 460.541 (0.000)
IFRS 3.798 (0.000) 11.313 (0.000) 365.695 (0.000)
Cook's Distance, max
FAS 0.777 0.677 0.769
IFRS 0.367 0.956 0.373
Nr. of observations
FAS 348 372 338
IFRS 604 632 592
Resudual Mean Square
FAS 0.021 0.024 0.030
IFRS 0.011 0.027 0.050
Independent samples t-test 1.874 1.114 1.680
Difference F-value (prob.) (0.000) (0.121) (0.000)
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= 0.000). Research hypothesis H1a, suggesting that there is a difference in the level of accrual-
based earnings management between FAS and IFRS, is accepted based on the statistically 
significant difference between the subsamples.  
 
In case of sales manipulation, adjusted R
2
 value is lower for IFRS (0.116) than for FAS 
(0.200) subsample. In percentages, the difference equals about 40 percent. The difference in 
coefficient of determination values can be interpreted to imply a higher level of sales 
manipulation among IFRS than FAS observations. Independent samples t-test result (p-value = 
0.121) shows that the difference between FAS and IFRS subsamples is not statistically 
significant at five percent probability level. Consequently, research hypothesis H1b, 
suggesting that there is a difference in the level of sales manipulation between FAS and IFRS, 
is rejected. Therefore, the study results indicate that there is no difference in the level of sales 
manipulation between FAS and IFRS. However, it can be noted that the difference between 
the subsamples is not far from being statistically significant at a conventional level. There 
might have been such changes in the level of sales manipulation which was not captured by 
the research methods used in this study.  
 
In case of overproduction, adjusted R
2
 value is lower for IFRS (0.847) than for FAS (0.905) 
subsample. In percentages, the difference is about 6 percent. The result could be interpreted to 
imply a higher level of production manipulation among IFRS observations. Independent 
samples t-test result (p-value = 0.000) shows that the difference between FAS and IFRS 
subsamples is statistically significant at five percent probability level. As a results, research 
hypothesis H1c, suggesting that there is a difference in the level of overproduction between 
FAS and IFRS, is accepted. 
 
In conclusion, study results suggest that accrual-based earnings management and 
overproduction are higher among FAS than IFRS observations. Therefore, the results imply 
that the level of accruals manipulation and overproduction has declined after IFRS adoption.  
Additionally, study results offer some support for increased level of sales manipulation after 
IFRS. However, the results relating to sales manipulation analysis are weak as the difference if 
not statistically significant at five percent probability level. Study results are in line with 
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international research suggesting increasing popularity of real earnings management (e.g. Li et 
al. 2011; Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006). However, as both accrual-based and real 
earnings management are found to have increased after IFRS adoption, the results are not in 
line with Cohen et al. (2009), who suggest a shift from accrual-based to real earnings 
management after the passage of SOX in the US. 
 
5.3. ANNUAL CHANGES IN EARNINGS MANAGEMENT  
 
The second objective of this study is to examine whether there are annual changes in the level 
of earnings management which do not relate to IFRS adoption. This subsection concentrates 
on presenting and analyzing study results relating to this objective.  
 
Yearly analysis is implemented based on the same principles as accounting regulation 
analysis, which was presented in the previous subchapter (5.3.1). Annual changes in the level 
of earnings management is studied by running regression for yearly subsamples and by 
evaluating differences in coefficient of determination (adjusted R
2
) values. As in case of 
accounting regulation related analysis, it is assumed that earnings management will have a 
negative effect on adjusted R
2
 value. Table 7 presents regression results for yearly subsamples. 
Further, Figure 4 presents yearly development of coefficient of determination values during 
the research period.  
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TABLE 7: REGRESSION STATISTICS FOR YEARLY SUBSAMPLES 
This table presents regression statistics for yearly subsamples. Statistics are presented separately for three 
earnings management types. Outliers have been eliminated from the sample before running the regression. 
Outliers are eliminated manually by analyzing Cook’s Distance values. P-values statistically significant at five 
percent or better are presented boldface.  
 
 
 
FIGURE 4: YEARLY DEVELOPMENT OF ADJUSTED R
2
 VALUES  
This figure presents yearly development of adjusted R
2
 values for accrual-based earnings management, sales 
manipulation and overproduction.  
 
 
 
 
Small sample size has a negative effect on the ability of the research models to capture 
estimations for earnings management in case of yearly analysis. This can be seen from 
evaluating model p-values, which are above 0.05 in case of several sample years, indicating 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Adjusted R-square
Accruals Manipulation 0.07 0.25 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.09 0.05 0.06
Sales Manipulation 0.13 0.35 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.06
Overproduction 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.75
F-value
(prob.)
2.88 10.82 0.79 1.30 2.96 1.18 0.08 4.22 2.61 3.37
(0.042) (0.000) (0.504) (0.289) (0.036) (0.322) (0.969) (0.008) (0.056) (0.021)
5.41 17.25 8.72 7.61 8.82 9.73 4.92 1.67 6.55 3.31
(.002) (.000)  (.000) (.000)  (.000) (.000) (.003) (.177) (.000)  (.023)
171.08 249.77 221.70 247.05 220.37 152.26 193.36 202.73 122.62 74.65
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Cook's Distance, max
Accruals Manipulation 0.11 0.43 1.20 0.59 0.85 1.09 0.31 0.79 0.19 0.39
Sales Manipulation 0.48 2.24 1.53 0.65 0.74 3.68 0.52 0.39 2.38 0.46
Overproduction 0.90 1.02 0.24 0.42 0.54 1.56 0.19 0.34 0.49 0.26
Nr. of observations
Accruals Manipulation 73 88 92 94 94 96 100 101 102 104
Sales Manipulation 91 93 95 100 102 102 102 105 105 104
Overproduction 72 88 88 93 94 94 95 100 100 100
Accruals Manipulation
Sales Manipulation
Overproduction
-0.20
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
m. € Accruals Manipulation Sales Manipulation Overproduction
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that the model is not statistically significant at five percent. All years with a p-value above 
0.05 are left out of analysis while comparing annual adjusted R
2
 values. Therefore, years to be 
excluded in case of accrual-based earnings management are 2004 (.322), 2006 (.111), 2007 
(.476) and 2010 (.286). In case of sales manipulation year 2008 is excluded from the analysis. 
In case of overproduction research model is significant at five percent during all sample years 
and there is no need to exclude any years from the analysis. 
 
In case of accrual-based earnings management, adjusted R
2
 value for year 2002 is abnormally 
high in relation to other sample years. This could be interpreted to imply an abnormally low 
level of earnings management during 2002 as comparing to other sample years. Results of 
independent samples t-test analyzing whether the differences between observed mean residual 
values of the samples are statistically significant are presented in Panel A of Appendix. The 
difference is statistically significant at five percent probability level in 30 cases of the 45 
conducted p-tests. All sample years are included in the analysis in this context. Statistical 
significance of the yearly differences seems not to be in connection with IFRS adoption, as 
most of the differences between IFRS sample years (2005-2010) are statistically significant at 
five percent probability level. Research hypothesis H2a, suggesting that there are changes in 
the level of accrual-based earnings management in different years that  are not explained by 
IFRS adoption, is accepted based on the high amount of differences that are statistically 
significant (67 %) and because statistical significance of yearly results is observed not to be 
linked to IFRS adoption. Therefore, study results indicate that there are such differences in the 
level of accrual-based earnings management in different years which do not relate to IFRS 
adoption. 
 
In case of sales manipulation, adjusted R
2
 value can be seen to be abnormally high during 
2002 (0.35) and abnormally low during 2010 (0.06) as comparing to other sample years. This 
could be interpreted to imply an abnormally low level of sales manipulation during 2002 and 
abnormally high level during 2010. Results from independent sample p-test (Panel B of 
Appendix) show that difference between two yearly samples is statistically significant at five 
percent probability level in 25 cases of the 45 conducted tests. Year 2006 stands out in the 
analysis, as the differences to all other sample years are found to be statistically significant. 
Further, the fact that difference between 2006 and all other yearly samples (both FAS and 
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IFRS years) is statistically significant suggests that the yearly variation is not linked to IFRS 
adoption. Research hypothesis H2b, suggesting that there are changes in the level of sales 
manipulation in different years that are not explained by IFRS adoption, is accepted based on 
the high amount of differences that are statistically significant (56 %) and because statistical 
significance of yearly results is observed not to be linked to IFRS adoption. Therefore, study 
results indicate that there are differences in the level of sales manipulation in different years 
which do not relate to IFRS adoption.  
 
In case of overproduction, coefficient of determination is abnormally low in 2010 (0.75) as 
comparing to other sample years. This could be suggested to imply an abnormally high level 
of overproduction during 2010. Results from independent sample p-test (Panel C of Appendix) 
show that difference between two yearly samples is statistically significant at five percent 
probability level in 21 cases of the 45 conducted tests. Year 2010 stands out in the analysis, as 
the differences to all other sample years are found to be statistically significant. This supports 
the finding of abnormally high level of overproduction during 2010. Further, it can be 
suggested that yearly variation in the level of overproduction is not connected to IFRS 
adoption, as year 2010 differences are statistically significant in comparison to all other 
sample years. Research hypothesis H2c, suggesting that there are changes in the level of 
overproduction in different years that are not explained by IFRS adoption, is accepted based 
on the high amount of differences that are statistically significant (47 %) and because 
statistical significance of yearly results is observed not to be linked to IFRS adoption. 
Therefore, study results indicate that there are differences in the level of overproduction in 
different years which do not relate to IFRS adoption. 
 
In conclusion, study results suggest that there are annual changes in the levels of adjusted R
2
 
values in case of all three earnings manipulation types. Additionally, it is observed that the 
differences are not in connection with IFRS adoption. All three research hypotheses relating to 
the annual analysis are accepted and the results imply that there are changes in the levels of all 
three earnings management types in different years which do not relate to IFRS adoption. This 
is in line with prior research suggesting that earnings management incentives vary in different 
financial environments (Agarwal et al 2007).  
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5.4. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
This subchapter tests robustness of earnings management analysis of the study. Firstly, 
robustness of accrual manipulation is tested by applying the DeAngelo (1986) model. This is 
implemented according to the twofold structure of the study, i.e. by discussing accounting 
standards and annual comparison based analysis separately. Secondly, robustness of all three 
manipulation methods is evaluated by analyzing annual changes in the levels of average 
variable values and discussing potential differences in the light of earnings management 
incentives. The latter part of the subchapter therefore concentrates on testing robustness of 
annual analysis. 
 
5.4.1. The DeAngelo model 
 
As discussed earlier in of context research methods in chapter 5.2.3, the DeAngelo (1986) 
model measures nondiscretionary accruals based on previous year total accruals. Discretionary 
accruals, on the other hand, are determined as the difference between total accruals and 
nondiscretionary accruals. As a result, discretionary accruals and thus also earnings 
management are assumed to exist if current and last year total accruals differ from each other. 
Based on this, the model suggests an increase in the level of accrual-based earnings 
management, if current period total accruals are higher than previous period total accruals. 
Table 8 presents total and discretionary accrual statistics for FAS and IFRS subsamples.  
 
TABLE 8: TOTAL AND DISCRETIONARY ACCRUAL STATISTICS ACCORDING 
TO THE DEANGELO MODEL, FAS AND IFRS SUBSAMPLES COMPARISON 
 
This table presents FAS and IFRS subsample statistics (m. €) for total and discretionary accruals. Discretionary 
accruals have been determined according to the DeAngelo (1986) model. 
 
 
  
N
25th 
Percentile Mean Median
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
deviation
FAS subsample
Total Accruals 369 -29.15 -69.87 -6.34 -0.78 308.31
Discretionary Accruals 361 -7.77 -12.43 -0.64 4.02 288.51
IFRS subsample
Total Accruals 627 -33.17 -58.28 -5.10 0.00 242.88
Discretionary Accruals 620 -7.08 0.41 0.11 10.15 226.60
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As can be seen from Table 8, absolute discretionary accrual estimation is bigger for FAS (-
12.43) than for IFRS (0.41) subsample. This could be interpreted to suggest a higher level of 
earnings management among FAS subsample. Average discretionary accrual estimation for 
IFRS subsample is close to zero, which suggests that there is no accrual-based earnings 
management among IFRS observations. The results could be interpreted to imply that that 
IFRS adoption has restricted the level of accrual-based earnings management. Also the level 
of average total accruals could be suggested to have declined after IFRS adoption, as 
magnitude of absolute total accruals average is higher for FAS (-69.87) than for IFRS (-58.28) 
subsample.  
 
The DeAngelo (1986) model is also used to test robustness of annual earnings management 
analysis. Figure 5 presents estimates for average yearly total and discretionary accruals.  
 
FIGURE 5: YEARLY DEVELOPMENT OF AVERAGE TOTAL AND 
DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS  
 
This table presents yearly development of average total and discretionary accruals (m. €) during the sample 
period. Discretionary accruals have been determined according to the DeAngelo (1986) model.  
 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 5, there are annual changes in the level of both total and 
discretionary accrual estimations. Discretionary accruals vary between -75.9 (2001) and 51.8 
(2010). From the viewpoint of accrual manipulation and the DeAngelo (1986) model, this 
could be suggested to imply that the amount of earnings management has varied between 51.8 
m. € upward management to 75.9 m. € downward management. As discussed in the research 
methods subsample (5.2.3), the DeAngelo (1986) model measures accrual manipulation 
without error when nondiscretionary accruals are constant and have a mean of zero during the 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total Accruals -91.1 -93.7 -87.4 -36.1 -43 -21.6 -36.6 -41.5 -114.8 -63.1
Discretionary Accruals -75.9 0.6 5 50.9 -7.3 21.4 -15.7 -4.8 -74.5 51.8
-150
-100
-50
0
50m. €
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research period. In this study, the level of average total accruals varies in different years. This 
potentially limits the ability of the DeAngelo (1986) model to measure earnings management. 
For example, the results suggest that maximum amount of upward accrual manipulation occur 
in 2010 as the discretionary accrual estimation gains its highest value during that year. 
However, the high estimation is a result of total accrual value in 2009, when total accruals fall 
to the lowest level during the whole ten year sample period. At the same time, total accruals 
are still negative in 2010 and equal -63.1 m. €. The same principle can be suggested to apply 
also for year 2004. Discretionary accrual estimation of the DeAngelo (1986) model suggests 
upward accrual manipulation amounting 50.9 m. €, as total accruals increase clearly from 
previous year.  
 
In conclusion, the analysis conducted by the DeAngelo (1986) model suggests that the level of 
accrual-based earnings management is higher among FAS than IFRS observations. The result 
is not in line with main analysis findings, as main analysis suggests an increase in accrual-
based earnings management after IFRS. In relation to the annual analysis, results from 
DeAngelo (1986) model analysis suggest that there are annual changes in the level of accrual-
based earnings management during the sample period. This is in line with main analysis 
results. 
 
5.4.2.  Annual changes in variable values 
 
Robustness of annual earnings management analysis is tested by evaluating yearly changes in 
the levels of average variable values during the sample period. As discussed in context of 
yearly descriptive statistics in chapter 5.1.3, changes in average variable values are notable 
especially in the end of the sample period. Years 2008 and 2009 can be seen to be interesting 
due to several reasons. Firstly, as discussed in context of descriptive statistics, major financial 
statement figure averages like sales, net income and total assets turn to a decline around 2008-
2009 after increasing for several years. Secondly, total accruals fall to the lowest level in the 
whole ten year period during 2009. Thirdly, Gross Domestic Product of Finland turns to a 
decline after increasing for fifteen years since 1994  and comes down with 8.4 percent in 2009 
(Statistics Finland 2012).  
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The existence of a relatively big amount of negative average accruals in 2009 during the 
downturn makes the year interesting from the viewpoint of accruals manipulation analysis. 
Figure 6 presents yearly development of absolute average total accruals and net income during 
the research period. 
 
FIGURE 6: YEARLY DEVELOPMENT OF AVERAGE NET INCOME AND TOTAL 
ACCRUALS  
 
This figure presents yearly development of absolute average net income and total accruals during the sample 
period. 
 
 
 
Different earnings management incentives and situations were discussed in the second chapter. 
The reader was provided with a review of research evidence concerning big bath accounting 
in context of executive changes (2.3.3). This includes recording large write-offs and special 
items in the year the management changes and increasing earnings for following reporting 
periods at the same time. It might have been possible that similar motivations could have been 
present also in 2009. Average net income declined already during the previous year from 2007 
to 2008. In addition, sales figures came down in 2009. Further, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the markets might have been anticipating the decline in the level of national Gross Domestic 
Product. As a result, one could suggest the markets to expect also a decline in companies’ 
earnings figures. In such situation, companies might have felt tempted to book negative 
accruals to report a bit lower net income at the same time. Theoretically, if net income values 
would be to decline anyway and this would also be anticipated by the markets, a bit lower 
level of earnings compared to the “true state” might not have made a big difference from the 
market reaction viewpoint. This would have enabled companies to transfer profits from 
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current to following periods. In case of big bath accounting in the context of executive 
changes, new management might be able to blame the decisions made by the old executives 
for the big charges made. Here, on the other hand, the lower earnings level could be explained 
with the challenging financial situation. Possible big bath accounting behavior during 2009 
could be suggested to be in line with the findings from Saastamoinen and Pajunen (2012), who 
document earnings bath type behavior in form of tendency of Finnish listed companies to 
report goodwill impairment when earnings would have been negative already before the 
impairment.  
 
Years 2008 to 2009 are interesting also from the viewpoint of real earnings management 
analysis. Figure 7 presents the yearly development of average sales during the sample period. 
Furthermore, Figure 8 presents annual development of average CFO.  
 
FIGURE 7: YEARLY DEVELOPMENT OF AVERAGE SALES 
This table presents yearly development of average sales (m. €) during the sample period.  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8: YEARLY DEVELOPMENT OF AVERAGE CFO  
This table presents yearly development of average CFO (m. €) during the sample period.  
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As can be seen from the above figures, average CFO turns to a considerable decline in 2008. 
Sales average, on the other hand, increases from the previous year. This is followed by a 
substantial decline in average sales from 2008 to 2009 and an increase in the level of CFO at 
the same time. As discussed earlier (4.1.1), sales manipulation and overproduction will both 
result as abnormally low current period CFO in relation to sales. Further, sales manipulation 
and overproduction will both also cause current period production costs to be abnormally high 
in relation to sales. Table 9 presents a yearly comparison of CFO-to-sales and production cost-
to-sales ratios. 
 
TABLE 9: YEARLY DEVELOPMENT OF CFO-TO-SALES (%) AND 
PRODUCTION-TO-SALES (%) RATIOS 
 
This table presents yearly development of CFO-to-sales and production-to-sales percentages during the sample 
period.  
 
 
 
As can be seen from the figure, CFO-to-sales ratio in 2008 equals 6.7 percent and is at a 
clearly lower level when comparing to other years during the ten year sample period. This 
could be interpreted to imply a higher level of (positive) real earnings management as 
comparing to other years. However, it is not possible to know based on above information 
whether the low level of CFO in relation to sales might be a result of sales manipulation, 
overproduction or a combination of them both. In 2001 average productions costs equal 87.8 
percent of total sales. This is substantially more when comparing to other years, as the ratio is 
less than or just around 80 percent during all other sample years. From the earnings 
management viewpoint this could be interpreted to imply a higher level of (positive) real 
earnings management in 2001 when comparing to other sample years.  
 
To conclude, robustness analysis suggests (negative) accrual-based earnings management in 
2009. Further, the analysis suggests (positive) real earnings management during 2001 and 
2008. At the same time, robustness analysis supports main analysis findings in relation to 
presence of annual variation in the level of earnings management during the sample period.  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CFO/Sales 12.6 % 11.4 % 11.1 % 9.6 % 9.1 % 8.6 % 10.1 % 6.7 % 10.2 % 8.9 %
Prod.cost/Sales 87.8 % 70.8 % 77.3 % 78.4 % 78.5 % 77.8 % 80.7 % 76.0 % 75.4 % 77.7 %
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Earnings management has been a topic of research already for several decades (e.g. Healy 
1985; Jones 1991). Academic research has traditionally concentrated on analyzing accruals 
manipulation, i.e. earnings management implemented by altering the level of discretionary 
accruals. However, there are research findings indicating that real earnings management, i.e. 
earnings management implemented by manipulating real operations, is becoming more 
dominating in today’s business environment (e.g. Li et. al 2011; Graham et al 2005; 
Roychowdhury 2006).  
 
There is research evidence suggesting that the level of real earnings management is higher in 
countries with stronger legal system (Li et al. 2011). Closely relating to this, prior research 
evidence indicates that companies have switched from accrual-based to real earnings 
management after the passage of Sarbanes Oxley-Act (SOX) in the US (Cohen et al. (2009). 
Also the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings management has been studied, but research 
findings are controversial. While some studies suggest IFRS to have a positive influence on 
accounting quality and earnings management (e.g. Barth et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2010), some 
other publications indicate increase in earnings management after IFRS (Jeanjean and Stolowy 
2008). Earlier research studying the effects of IFRS adoption has focused on accounting 
quality and thus concentrates on accrual-based earnings management. 
 
All listed companies in European Union member countries have been required to apply IFRS 
since 2005. Respectively, all Finnish publicly quoted companies were required to adopt IFRS 
in 2005. This creates an opportunity and motivations to study the effect of IFRS adoption on 
earnings management in Finland. Respectively, the main objective of the study is to explore 
whether mandatory IFRS adoption has affected earnings management practices among Finnish 
publicly quoted companies. Earnings management is studied by focusing to both accrual-based 
and real earnings management.  
 
There is research evidence suggesting that companies’ earnings management incentives vary 
in different financial situations (Agarwal et al. 2007). Financial situation in Finland changes 
during the research period, as economic downturn takes place at the end of the sample period. 
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This creates motivations to conduct yearly analysis of earnings management in Finland. 
Respectively, the secondary objective of this study is to explore whether there are annual 
changes in the level of earnings management which do not relate to IFRS adoption. 
 
The empirical part of the study is implemented as quantitative analysis applying OLS 
regression model to explore changes in the level of earnings management, including both 
accrual-based and real earnings management. Accruals manipulation is analyzed by using the 
Jones (1991) model. Real earnings management is analyzed by following Roychowdhury 
(2006) and thus the analysis is implemented by using the model developed by Dechow et al. 
(1998). Real earnings management analysis is conducted by studying sales manipulation and 
overproduction. The main empirical analysis is implemented by running regression separately 
for the subsamples and by evaluating differences in the ability of the applied research models 
to explain variation in the dependent variable values. An increase (decline) in the ability of the 
research model to explain variation in dependent variable value is interpreted to reflect a 
decline (increase) level of earnings management.  
 
The sample consists of Finnish publicly quoted companies in Helsinki Stock Exchange for 
years 2001-2010.  Companies representing banks, investment or insurance firms (primary 
SIC-codes 60-67) are excluded from the sample. The final sample includes 968 firm-year 
observations for accrual-based earnings management analysis, 1005 for sales manipulation 
and 931 for overproduction. The sample is divided into subsamples in two different ways 
according to the two research objectives. In relation to the main objective studying the effect 
of IFRS adoption on earnings management the sample is divided into two subsamples based 
on accounting regulation, i.e. FAS and IFRS subsamples. Further, in relation to the secondary 
objective examining annual changes in earnings management the sample is divided into ten 
yearly subsamples. Regression is run separately for different subsamples to evaluate 
differences in the levels of earnings management.  
 
In relation to the main objective, the results suggest that levels of accrual-based earnings 
management and overproduction are higher among IFRS than FAS observations. The results 
relating to accrual-based earnings management and overproduction are statistically significant 
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at five percent probability level. As a result, research hypotheses relating to these two earnings 
management types are accepted. Therefore, study results suggest an increase in accrual-based 
earnings management and overproduction as a result of IFRS adoption. Empirical analysis 
also offers some support for an increase in sales manipulation after IFRS adoption. However, 
the result is not statistically significant at five percent probability level and the research 
hypothesis relating to sales manipulation is rejected. Therefore, the results suggest that there is 
no difference in the level of sales manipulation between FAS and IFRS. Study results are in 
line with international research suggesting increasing popularity of real earnings management 
(e.g. Li et al. 2011; Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006). However, as the levels of both 
accrual-based and real earnings management are suggested to have increased after IFRS 
adoption, the results are not in line with Cohen et al. (2009), who suggest a shift from accrual-
based to real earnings management after the passage of SOX in the US. Robustness of accrual-
based earnings management analysis is tested by applying the DeAngelo (1986) model. 
Robustness analysis results suggest a decline in the level of accrual-based earnings 
management after IFRS adoption and the results are thus not in line with main analysis 
findings.  
 
In relation to the secondary objective, study results indicate annual changes in the levels of all 
three earnings management types during the sample period. All three research hypotheses are 
accepted based on the high amount of differences that are statistically significant and because 
statistical significance of annual results is observed not to be linked to IFRS adoption. Thus, 
the results suggest that there are changes in the level of accrual-based earnings management, 
sales manipulation and overproduction in different years which are not explained by IFRS 
adoption. Robustness is tested by the DeAngelo (1986) model (accrual-based earnings 
management) and by evaluating annual changes in average variable values. Robustness 
analysis results support main analysis findings. Suggested presence of annual variation in the 
level of earnings management is in line with Agarwal et al. (2007), who find evidence 
indicating that managements’ earnings management incentives vary in different financial 
situations. 
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This study contributes to prior research by providing information about the effect of IFRS 
adoption on accrual-based and real earnings management in Finland. Further, it supports the 
view that earnings management behavior and motives might vary in different years and in 
different financial situations. 
 
Weaknesses of this study are mainly related to small sample size, which creates challenges for 
the reliability of the study results especially in case of annual earnings management analysis. 
However, it would only be possible to increase sample size by extending research period, as 
the amount of listed companies in Finland is fixed. Increasing the research period, on the other 
hand, would only be possible in case of IFRS adoption related analysis –not in context of the 
annual evaluation, where small sample size constitutes a larger problem.  
 
Prior research on the effect of IFRS adoption on accounting quality and earnings management 
offers controversial results. While some studies suggest IFRS to have a positive influence on 
accounting quality and earnings management (e.g. Barth et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2010), some 
other publications indicate increase in earnings management after IFRS (e.g. Jeanjean and 
Stolowy 2008). As prior research has concentrated on accounting quality, the focus has been 
on accrual-based earnings management. This study draws attention to real earnings 
management by examining accrual-based and real earnings management separately. This 
enables observing possible shifts between the two earnings management types. Still, it is good 
to recognize that higher accounting quality and lower level of accrual-based earnings 
management do not as such mean a decline in overall earnings management. If accrual-based 
earnings management is replaced by real activities manipulation, it is possible for overall 
earnings management to increase at the same time with reducing accounting related (i.e. 
accrual-based) manipulation. Based on these viewpoints, I encourage widening perspective to 
cover also real earnings management related behavior in context of future earnings 
management research.  
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APPENDIX: INDEPENDENT SAMPLES T-TEST, YEARLY ANALYSIS 
 
This appendix presents yearly results from independent samples t-test, which analyzes whether the difference 
between observed mean residual values of the samples is statistically significant. P-values statistically significant 
at five percent or better are presented boldface. Results for accrual-based earnings management, sales 
manipulation and overproduction are presented separately in different panels. 
 
 
Panel A: Annual accrual-based earnings management differences 
 
 
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mn sq. 0.006 0.004 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.033 0.011 0.007 0.004 0.005
Dg fr. 69 84 88 90 90 92 96 97 98 100
0.006 1.379 1.836 1.588 1.113 5.703 1.981 1.212 1.313 1.234
69 (0.080) (0.004) (0.020) (0.314) (0.000) (0.001) (0.190) (0.107) (0.167)
0.004 2.533 2.190 1.536 7.865 2.732 1.672 1.050 1.117
84 (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.406) (0.296)
0.011 1.156 1.649 3.106 1.079 1.515 2.411 2.267
88 (0.247) (0.010) (0.000) (0.357) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000)
0.009 1.426 3.591 1.247 1.310 2.085 1.960
90 (0.047) (0.000) (0.143) (0.096) (0.000) (0.001)
0.006 5.122 1.779 1.089 1.462 1.374
90 (0.000) (0.003) (0.340) (0.033) (0.061)
0.033 2.879 4.705 7.488 7.040
92 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.011 1.634 2.601 2.445
97 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000)
0.007 1.591 1.496
97 (0.011) (0.023)
0.004 1.064
98 (0.379)
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
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Panel B: Annual sales manipulation differences 
 
 
 
Panel C: Annual overproduction differences 
 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mn sq. 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.014 0.020 0.073 0.017 0.012 0.009 0.011
Dg fr. 87 89 91 96 98 98 98 101 100 100
0.011 1.107 1.736 1.258 1.718 6.394 1.458 1.078 1.287 1.006
87 (.317) (.005) (.139) (.005) (.000) (.037) (.361) (.111) (.491)
0.010 1.568 1.393 1.903 7.079 1.615 1.193 1.162 1.113
89 (.017) (.057) (.001) (.000) (.011) (.198) (.232) (.303)
0.007 2.183 2.983 11.098 2.532 1.871 1.349 1.746
91 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001) (.074) (.004)
0.014 1.366 5.083 1.160 1.167 1.618 1.251
96 (.063) (.000) (.234) (.222) (.009) (.134)
0.020 3.720 1.178 1.595 2.211 1.709
98 (.000) (.209) (.011) (.000) (.004)
0.073 4.384 5.933 8.225 6.358
98 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
0.017 1.353 1.876 1.450
98 (.066) (.001) (.033)
0.012 1.386 1.072
101 (.052) (.365)
0.009 1.294
100 (.100)
2006
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2007
2008
2009
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Mn sq. 0.019 0.027 0.023 0.030 0.033 0.040 0.041 0.034 0.031 0.070
Dg fr. 67 83 83 88 89 89 90 95 95 95
0.019 1.423 1.213 1.592 1.724 2.112 2.177 1.817 1.647 3.675
67 (.068) (.207) (.024) (.010) (.001) (.001) (.005) (.016) (.000)
0.027 1.174 1.119 1.211 1.484 1.530 1.277 1.157 2.583
83 (.234) (.304) (.189) (.035) (.025) (.128) (.249) (.000)
0.023 1.313 1.422 1.742 1.795 1.498 1.358 3.031
83 (.106) (.053) (.006) (.004) (.030) (.077) (.000)
0.030 1.083 1.327 1.368 1.141 1.034 2.309
88 (.354) (.093) (.071) (.266) (.437) (.000)
0.033 1.225 1.263 1.054 1.047 2.132
89 (.170) (.136) (.402) (.414) (.000)
0.040 1.031 1.163 1.283 1.688
89 (.444) (.235) (.116) (.007)
0.041 1.198 1.322 1.688
90 (0.192) (.090) (.006)
0.034 1.103 2.232
95 (.316) (.000)
0.031 2.232
95 (.000)
2009
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
